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REGULATORY ACCESS TO CONTAMINATED SITES: SOME NEW
TWISTS TO AN OLD TALE
ROGER D. SCHWENKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has become more and more frequent for governmental agencies
and private parties to request access to a piece of property in connection
with environmental assessments. It would seem that this is a reasonable
process, yet many questions have developed regarding the implementation
of statutes and rules authorizing such access. These materials attempt to
examine both federal and state statutory provisions, and to offer some
observations about the current status of state and federal law.
Until the decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals last
year in United States v. Tarkowski, 1 at least in access requests predicated
on the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),2 there was very little
expectation that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") would be
obligated to offer any but the most minimal explanation of why it needed
access to a particular site, what it planned to do with or on the site after
access was given, and how long the agency or its contractors might be
there. However, as discussed further below, at least in some instances the
EPA will now be expected to offer at least some justification, and maybe
even more than that.
After looking at the apparent site access expectations and
procedures in the CERCLA setting, when contrasted to those in most other
environmental contamination situations, a limited examination will then
be made of "takings" law, to determine if some asserted rights of entry
could amount to a taking.
Obviously, it is reasonable for governmental agencies to request
access, and that need serves as the foundation for the federal CERCLA
statutory access provisions, as well as similar provisions in comparable
* Mr. Schwenke is a partner at the law firm of Carlton Fields in Tampa, Florida.
248 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2001).
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1994).
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state statutes. The EPA, in addition to the statutory provisions discussed
below, has published an EPA guidance document with respect to
CERCLA site access.3 The EPA takes a very strict and strong
interpretation of its right to demand access, and in the author's experience,
will offer very few assurances to the landowner as a part of that process.
A copy of the "Standard" EPA form of "Consent" is in the guidance
document, and also included as an Exhibit A to these materials.4 By way
of contrast, these materials also include, as Exhibit B, a private party site
access document, which the author believes contains a more "rational and
reasonable" approach to the various issues that should be considered when
access is sought.
Many landowners also probably believe that when an agency
demanding access goes too far, they are protected by their right to assert a
claim of there being a "taking" of their property. However, as will be seen
from examination of these materials, that right and opportunity is very
limited. For parties caught up in federal enforcement of CERCLA,
through some new provisions that are beginning to appear in CERCLA
settlement consent decrees, the right may become even more limited.
Finally, access issues and the (hopefully) reasonable approach taken in
their demands for access by state and federal regulatory agencies also now
need to be evaluated in light of the conditions precedent for a landowner
to be able to assert an innocent landowner defense, a contiguous property
defense, or to receive prospective purchaser protection, subsequent to the
late 2001 enactment of the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act,5 signed into law by President Bush on
3 These are attached to these materials as "Appendix A." They also can be obtained off
of the EPA web pages at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/osre/870605.html, and are identified as
OSWER Directive #9829.2 (June 5, 1987), Entry and Continued Access Under
CERCLA, United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
4 This term has been put in quotes because the author of this Article believes that there is
very little real voluntary "consent" associated with many such documents received by
EPA. As will be evident in many comments throughout this Article, the author believes
that EPA (and the Department of Justice in its efforts to enforce such agreements) should
recognize that "a material distinction exists between a consent form freely entered into
and an agreement entered into that contemplates activities on Plaintiff's property which,
but for [the agency's] statutory authority to force entry, Plaintiffs would not have
allowed. This element of required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of
occupation." Juliano v. Montgomery-Ostego-Schoharie Solid Waste, 983 F. Supp. 319,
329 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)).
5 Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
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January 11, 2002. Under the terms of Title 1I, "Brownfields Revitalization
and Environmental Restoration," Subtitle B, "Brownfields Liability
Clarifications," Sections 221-223, in order to retain protection from
contamination emanating from contiguous property, to qualify as an
exempted "bona fide prospective purchaser," or to retain "innocent
landowner" status, the landowner now is obligated to provide "full
cooperation, assistance, and [facility] access to persons that are authorized
to conduct response actions ... at [the] facility (including the cooperation
and access necessary for the installation, integrity, operation, and
maintenance of any complete or partial response action . . . at the
facility).6
Although early cases indicated that there were some questions
concerning the EPA's authority to enter private property to conduct
investigations or for remediation,7 the Superfund Amendments and
6 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)(40)(E) (2002). The Act requires EPA by regulation, no later than
two years after the enactment of the new statute, to establish standards and practices for
the purpose of specifying what will satisfy the "all appropriate inquiries" requirement to
qualify as an "innocent landowner." Section 101(35), subparagraph (B), as amended by
Section 223 of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act.
The "contiguous properties" defense added by Section 221 authorizes (but does not
require) EPA to issue assurances that no enforcement action would be initiated against
qualifying entities or persons, and to grant cost recovery and contribution protection for
those entities and persons. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(3). The access, land use compliance and
institutional control assurances, necessary to qualify for these two sections' protections
(as well as for the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser status created by Section 222) are not
specified in the Act as subjects that the EPA must consider in this policy development
and rule promulgation. However, in the author's opinion these issues and related the
EPA guidance and policy, including the EPA Entry and Access Guidance attached to this
Article, should be reexamined. Perhaps in this process the EPA could reconsider and
potentially revise some of the strictness of the original guidance, in light of the issues
raised here, plus the added requirements interpreted though the Tarkowski decision. The
EPA has already announced that as a part of its implementation of the new Act, the
EPA's enforcement office, the Department of Justice, and states will likely develop
policy statements explaining how they interpret the law's new liability changes, and
specifically the relief provided to landowners, prospective purchasers and contiguous
landowners. Inside EPA's Superfund Report, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Jan. 7, 2002), at 3.
7 A major impetus for the SARA changes to confirm the agency access right was the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Outboard Marine Corporation v. Thomas, 773 F.2d
883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded in light of amendment of §9604, 479 U.S.
1002 (1986). The case involved an effort by EPA to gain access for site remediation at a
high priority location in Illinois. As noted in the opinion, EPA conceded that the source
of its authority to enter for actual construction was unclear, observing that "Congress,
possibly through oversight, neglected to provide a right of entry for this purpose." Id. at
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Reauthorization Act of 19868 eliminated any doubt about the Agency
authority. Section 104(e)(1) 9 was amended and added to CERCLA
through the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), to provide that entry to property was permitted for
"determining the need for response, or choosing or taking any response
action under this title, or otherwise enforcing the provisions of this
title. ""1
The statutory provisions added by SARA also established a
standard for when access could be sought, and defined the extent of
property that could be entered. The EPA is authorized to exercise entry
authority "if there is a reasonable basis to believe there may be a release or
889. The Court determined that EPA's then-existing statutory authority "to enter to
inspect and obtain samples, gather information, and inspect records [was] limited to the
hazardous substance itself;" the Section [104(e)(1)] "does not provide authority for taking
subsurface samples to determine what construction can be supported or for the other
things the EPA seeks to accomplish as preliminary to construction." Id. at 889-90. At
least in non-emergency situations, the EPA, under 104(e), does not have an "open ended
right to enter" where EPA pleased [specifically on private tracts which are not themselves
alleged to be part of the hazard]; the Court added that this right "may be what EPA needs
and does not have," but further observed that "[o]nly Congress, not we, can supply that
power." Id. at 890. The Supreme Court, in its remand, noted that the lower court holding
that § 9604(e) did not authorize EPA to enter a waste site to effect response activities was
reversed "in light of the amendment of [§ 9604(e)] expressly to authorize EPA to enter
such sites. Id.
Despite the vacation and remand by the U. S. Supreme Court, the observations of
Circuit Judge Wood, over 15 years ago, also bear on the issue addressed in this Article of
when an access intrusion can go so far that it amounts to a compensable taking:
EPA argues, never mind, we have an open ended right to enter
where we please to fulfill any of our obligations to the public and the
bill should be sent by the private owner not to us but to the government
in care of the Tucker Act. Then if we were authorized to enter as we
claim, says the EPA, and if in fact what we did actually amounted to a
taking, then you, the owner, may recover any damages incurred.
Otherwise, thank you very much for the several months' use of your
land.
Regardless of the noble purposes of the EPA, at least in
nonemergency situations, that procedural approach strains our usual
constitutional concepts.
773 Fed. 2d at 890 (emphasis added).
8 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
9No attempt is made in these materials always to give the parallel Title 42, United States
Code, provisions, which correspond to the CERCLA Sections noted. However, for the
reader's reference, they can be located, respectively, at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) and 9613(h).
10 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act § 104(m).
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threat of release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant." ' 1
Based on the legislative history, it appears that the SARA amendments did
not require that there be an actual release or threatened release, on the
property to be entered, before the EPA could have a right of entry.' 2
At least prior to their recent construction in Tarkowski, the
statutory provisions on their face purported to authorize entry to take place
in any location where hazardous substances may be located, or where they
may have been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from;
any place a hazardous substance has or may have been released; any place
which is or may be threatened by the release of a hazardous substance; or
any place where entry is needed to determine the need for response or the
appropriate response, or to effectuate a response action under CERCLA. 13
Another provision added by SARA, § 104(e)(1), clarifies that the EPA is
authorized to enter any place or property adjacent to the place or
properties described previously. It would be perhaps an epitome of
understatement to suggest that this grant of entry authority is quite broad.
Despite the breadth of this provision, the recent opinion in Tarkowski
suggests that, even with the requirement of reasonable basis being "easily
satisfied" since there is nothing in Section 104(e)(1) about the magnitude
of contamination, some evaluation of the extent of disruption to be caused
by access and remediation may now be required:
But this makes it all the more important to consider
whether the agency's proposed action is unreasonable
(arbitrary and capricious). The EPA may be reasonable,
although we doubt it, in wanting to conduct additional tests
on Tarkowski's property-that would depend in part on
how disruptive the tests would be to Tarkowski's use of the
property. Cf. United States v. Fisher, supra, 864 F.2d at
438. But given what the agency now knows or has reason
to know, which is that the property although unsightly is
not a site or source of even a slight environmental hazard,
for it to want to go ahead and rip up the property without
ll Id.
12 The House Energy and Commerce draft legislation at one point contained such a
limitation. See H.R. RP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 158 (1985). This limitation, however, was
deleted prior to introduction on the bill for floor debate. Contrast H.R. 2817, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec., H. 10857 (Dec. 4, 1985).
13 42 U. S.C. § 9604(e)(3) (1994).
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completing its inspection bespeaks a precipitance that
would be warranted only by emergency conditions. The
EPA assures us that it won't undertake any drastic remedial
action until it completes new tests. But, if so, why is it not
seeking merely an order to allow it to go onto the property
to conduct tests that would not unreasonably interfere with
Tarkowski's use and enjoyment of his property? The
agency is adamant in the assertion of a right to carry out
remedial action whatever the test results are, or indeed
before completing or for that matter beginning any further
tests.
We do not know whether Tarkowski's angry
neighbors exert a malign influence over the local office of
the EPA, but it is to protect citizens against arbitrary and
overreaching actions by government bureaucrats that
courts are empowered to prevent arbitrary and capricious
interferences with property rights. It is unreasonable for
the EPA to insist on a judicial carte blanche to embark on
drastic remedial action in advance of obtaining any
rational basis for believing there is any danger to the
environment that would warrant such action. 14
II. CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES
Following is a summary of the case law interpreting these
CERCLA and SARA statutory provisions. Subject to the potential for
some change as a result of the Tarkowski decision, several themes run
through these cases:
(1) A property owner need not have generated the hazardous
substances to be held liable under Section 9607(a).
(2) The "imminent and substantial endangerment" language of
Section 9606(a) is not limited to emergency situations. While the
risk of harm must be imminent, the harm itself need not be.
14 United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 599-600 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
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(3) A court must issue an injunction when the EPA or State agency has
"a reasonable basis to believe" there may be a threat of release of a
hazardous substance.
(4) When consent is not granted to entry authorized by Section
9604(e)(3), the U.S. can either obtain an order of entry and then go
to the federal court for a court order to comply or proceed directly
to federal court to obtain an original court order enjoining
interference with an authorized request entry.
(5) If the EPA elects to proceed to federal court seeking a motion for
immediate access, on the basis of the statutory provisions in 42
U.S.C. § 9604(e), it must establish five facts or legal conclusions:
(a) The entry the EPA seeks is for one of the categories
authorized by subsections (e)(2), (3) or (4) of 42 U.S.C.
Section 9604; 15 and
15 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(2) Access to information. Any officer, employee, or
representative described in paragraph (1) may require any
person who has or may have information relevant to any of the
following to furnish, upon reasonable notice, information or
documents relating to such matter:
(A) The identification, nature, and quantity of materials
which have been or are generated, treated, stored, or
disposed of at a vessel or facility or transported to a
vessel or facility.
(B) The nature or extent of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant
at or from a vessel or facility.
(C) Information relating to the ability of a person to pay
for or to perform a cleanup.
In addition, upon reasonable notice, such person either (i) shall
grant any such officer, employee, or representative access at
all reasonable times to any vessel, facility, establishment,
place, property, or location to inspect and copy all documents
or records relating to such matters or (ii) shall copy and
furnish to the officer, employee, or representative all such
documents or records, at the option and expense of such
person.
(3) Entry. Any officer, employee, or representative described in
paragraph (I) is authorized to enter at reasonable times any of
the following:
2002]
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(b) The EPA's right of entry has been obstructed by the
defendant; and
(c) The EPA has a reasonable basis to believe that there may
be a release or threat of a release of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant; and
(d) The EPA has sought the defendant's consent to its entry;
and
(A) Any vessel, facility, establishment or other place or
property where any hazardous substance or pollutant
or contaminant may be or has been generated, stored,
treated, disposed of, or transported from.
(B) any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or
property from which or to which a hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant has been or
may have been released.
(C) any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or
property where such release is or may be threatened.
(D) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or
property where entry is needed to determine the need
for response or the appropriate response or to
effectuate a response action under this title.
(4) Inspection and samples.
(A) Authority. Any officer, employee or representative
described in paragraph (1) is authorized to inspect
and obtain samples from any vessel, facility,
establishment, or other place or property referred to
in paragraph (3) or from any location of any
suspected hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant. Any such officer, employee, or
representative is authorized to inspect and obtain
samples of any containers or labeling for suspected
hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants.
Each such inspection shall be completed with
reasonable promptness.
(B) Samples. If the officer, employee, or representative
obtains any samples, before leaving the premises he
shall give to the owner, operator, tenant, or other
person. in charge of the place from which the samples
were obtained a receipt describing the sample
obtained and, if requested, a portion of each such
sample. A copy of the results of any analysis made
of such samples shall be furnished promptly to the
owner, operator, tenant, or other person in charge, if
such person can be located.
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(e) The EPA's demand for entry is not arbitrary and capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise illegal.
(6) The statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 9604(e)(5)(B), makes no distinction
between properties containing hazardous substances and those that
are merely adjacent to such properties.
The recent decision by Judge Posner from the Seventh Circuit in
the Tarkowski16 case may have changed some of these rules. In that
instance, the EPA sought access to a site both to determine the extent of
contamination, and to conduct an unspecified remedial activity. In terms
of the precedent arising from this case, it probably is very significant that
the EPA here chose to combine in one order a request for site access and
an order for remediation. The EPA (perhaps for reasons that would appear
obvious to anyone reading the Seventh Circuit opinion) did not seek
review by the Supreme Court.
In response to the EPA request, the Court concluded that such a
request was subject to judicial review and, despite the provisions of
CERCLA Section 113(h), which prevent a court from reviewing a
challenge to a removal or a remedial action, CERCLA did not prevent a
challenge to an access order when the EPA claimed a right to undertake
remedial efforts before determining if the site presented a hazard.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that barring pre-enforcement
review in these circumstances would allow the EPA to nullify judicial
control of access orders, by potentially stating in every application that
while the purpose was merely to test, the government reserved the right to
take unidentified and unspecified remedial actions in the future, based on
test results. The Court concluded that the EPA's reading of the statute was
not appropriate, since it would allow the EPA unlimited power of
warrantless search and seizure, exceeding both the statutory and
constitutional authority of the EPA.
Mr. Tarkowski is an elderly man who lives on a 16-acre tract in
Wauconda, Illinois, which was described in the decision and in the briefs
as a formerly rural community that has now become an affluent suburb of
Chicago. His dwelling is built out of surplus materials, which he has
accumulated over the time he has been on the property, and his yard "is
16 Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 596.
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full of what his upscale neighbors regard as junk."'17 The Court gave as
examples of "junk," barrels, batteries and construction materials. Before
the case reached the Federal District Court and the Seventh Circuit, the
neighbors had previously complained to both the State of Illinois
Environmental Agency, and to the EPA.
The EPA claimed that Mr. Tarkowski denied access to the property
in September 1999. In response, the EPA sought an order under Section
104(e) of CERCLA, asking the Court to preclude Mr. Tarkowski from
preventing the EPA from entering his land to fence it, conduct additional
tests, install groundwater monitoring wells, dig for buried drums, and to
remove various (unidentified) objects. The District Court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the government motion for an order in aid of
immediate access, a motion that EPA requested contemporaneously with
its filing of the complaint. The hearing began in December 1999, and
concluded in late March 2000, after the Court had appointed counsel for
Tarkowski.18
The District Court denied the EPA's motion and dismissed the
EPA suit, concluding that the EPA's request was unreasonable because the
contamination was de minimis. The District Court concluded that the
access for which the EPA sought authorization would be arbitrary and
capricious in the circumstances presented to the Court. The EPA appealed
to the Seventh Circuit.
In a very strong opinion, on behalf of the three members of the
panel, Judge Posner affirmed the trial court decision:
The EPA makes no pretense that the position it advocates
serves a public purpose, strikes a reasonable balance
between property rights and community rights, rationally
advances the agency's mission, or even comports with the
limitations that the Constitution has been interpreted to
place on federal regulation of purely local activities, not to
mention the limitation that the Fourth Amendment places
on searches and seizures. Access orders are orders to seize
as well as search, because of the control that the agency
exerts over the property even when it is just doing test
borings and other investigative work. That such orders
must comply with the Fourth Amendment is apparent from
17 Id. at 598.
18 See United States v. Tarkowski, 2000 WL 696740, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,622,
Memorandum Opinion (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2000).
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Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56
L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). Rather, the EPA defends its position
as ineluctably compelled by statutory language that we
have now to examine in order to determine whether the
case can be decided without our having to reach any
constitutional issues.
9
This was not the only strong admonition-given by the Seventh
Circuit to the EPA. Another read as follows:
In effect the agency is claiming the authority to undertake
warrantless searches and seizures, of a peculiarly
destructive sort, on residential property despite the absence
of any exigent circumstances. It is unlikely, even apart from
constitutional considerations, that Congress intended to
confer such authority on the EPA.2°
The Court acknowledged that the EPA has authority under
CERCLA Sections 104(e)(1)(3) and (4) to access property to inspect or to
obtain samples for testing, or "to effectuate a response action" under
Section 104(e)(3)(D). 21 However, the Court added that this latter authority
"to effectuate a response action" was applicable only "if there is a
reasonable basis to believe there may be a release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.
'22
The Seventh Circuit also interpreted CERCLA Section
104(e)(5)(B)(i), which provides that the EPA could obtain an access order,
to preclude the issuance of such an order if "under the circumstances of
the case the demand for entry or inspection is arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
2T
The EPA cited, as its primary argument in favor of Section 113(h),
which prevents judicial review of challenges to removal of remedial
actions until the remedy is complete. The Court found the provision to be
inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit determined that the EPA was
19 Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 599 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 600-01 (emphasis added).
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requesting access to conduct a remedial action, as well as an investigation.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that under the provisions of Section
113(h), the Court had no authority to limit the remedial measures the EPA
could take once it gained access.24 The Seventh Circuit determined that
the EPA would have authority to obtain access solely to investigate
contamination, but would first have to make a sufficient showing.
The opinion does not specify what would constitute a "sufficient
showing," since that narrow issue was not present in the litigation.
Likewise, the Court observed that once the EPA issued a remedial order
based on test results, the bar on pre-enforcement review under § 113(h) of
CERCLA probably would prevent Mr. Tarkowski or others from
challenging it. However, in this case, the EPA was seeking an access
order, without which it could not conduct remedial actions on the
property, rather than seeking only a remediation order.
Summing it all up, and giving a strong indication to the EPA that
the agency's interpretation of CERCLA access authority may now have to
be reconsidered, the Seventh Circuit observed:
[W]hen an access order is sought, judicial jurisdiction
clicks in; the arbitrary and capricious standard clicks in.
The right of judicial review of agency action that is
expressly conferred by Section 104(e)(5) can thus be
preserved without impairment of the objectives of Section
113(h) ....
If the agency's very ground for going on the
property is to undertake remedial measures, the court
cannot perform its duty of determining whether the
agency 's proposed action is arbitrary or capricious without
considering whether the measures proposed are a
reasonable basis for authorizing what would otherwise be
a trespass.
25
In a separate, concurring opinion, Judge Ripple raised a question
about the scope of the Seventh Circuit analysis. He believed that it left "a
conceptual and practical difficulty that is bound to emerge in future and
more difficult cases." 26 Judge Ripple alluded to the fact that the panel had
24 Id. at 601.
25 United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 603.
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observed that the Tarkowski fact pattern was a "very unusual case," noting
that "[w]hat makes this case unusual is the very limited evidence of an
environmental hazard that the E.P.A. has put forward to justify its request
for an access order that includes the authority to 'effectuate a response
action.'
27
Because he considers the Tarkowski litigation to be a "narrow and
unusual situation," Judge Ripple went on to contemplate future cases
where the EPA could proffer more significant evidence of a release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, and sought access to that land to
investigate the nature and extent of the problem, and to implement a
remedy.28 Judge Ripple concluded by observing "what remains unclear
are the circumstances that will justify a court's denial of entry to effectuate
a remedial order."29 He adds:
Yet, when the E.P.A.'s evidence of contamination allows
access for some type of response action, but makes the
contemplated remedy seem significantly disproportionate
to the perceived violation, the limitations on the court's
authority are not well-defined. Today's opinion, by
suggesting that the E.P.A.'s remediation request must be
reasonable, implies that there must be a proportionality
between the investigative results and the proposed plan.
Such a balancing approach may result in courts assuming a
great deal more latitude than Congress intended.30
Not surprisingly, Judge Ripple recommended more explicit Congressional
guidance to "permit the E.P.A. to fulfill its responsibilities and the courts
to respond more precisely to the legislative mandate."
3
'
In his brief, Mr. Tarkowski had argued extensively that application
of CERCLA in the fashion urged by the EPA would exceed the scope of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, relying on arguments
grounded in the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez.
32
27 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(3)(D) (1994)).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 603-04 (7th Cir. 2001).
31 Id. at 604.
32 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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However, Judge Posner and the rest of the panel considered this to be
nothing more significant than a "procedural detail," which could not be
granted because Tarkowski was not seeking a different judgment, which
the Seventh Circuit felt was the only basis on which a cross-appeal is
either necessary or permitted.33 Instead, the Court suggests that the
primary reason for the cross-appeal, where this constitutional argument
had first been raised, was an effort to limit the EPA's ability to seek an
access order limited to inspection and testing. In the last sentence of the
opinion, such arguments were left for "future consideration," primarily
because the Court had "no reason to believe that the EPA will continue to
be obsessed as it has been for far too long with the minuscule threat to the
environment"34 that Mr. Tarkowski poses.
As noted previously, early in the trial court proceedings the
District Judge appointed counsel to defend Mr. Tarkowski.35 After the
Seventh Circuit decision became final, Mr. Tarkowski's court-appointed
counsel petitioned the District Court for an award of attorney's fees and
expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). 36 The
government did not contest counsel's ability to seek an award for fees and
expenses despite the fact that counsel had been appointed by the court and
had agreed to handle the matter pro bono.3 7 However, the government
argued that its efforts to seek access had been substantially justified.
District Judge Matthew Kennelly agreed with the government that
the mere fact that the EPA had lost at both the trial and appellate level did
not necessarily mean that the government position was unjustified.
Instead, he determined that the government position could be substantially
justified "if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a
reasonable basis in law and fact," citing and quoting Young v. Sullivan.38
In addition, Judge Kennelly was even willing to deny an EAJA award of
fees and costs if the agency conduct had been found to be arbitrary and
capricious, citing and quoting Andrew v. Bowen.39
33 Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 602-03.
34 Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
35John Tarkowski was represented, pro bono, by Mark R. Ter Molen, Richard F. Bulger,
and Susan Elizabeth Brice, all with the firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, IL.
36 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2002).
37See Ed A. Wilson, Inc. v. General Services Administration, 126 F.3d 1406, 1409 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
38 972 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. .1992) (and noting that Young had relied on and quoted
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988)).
39 837 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Looking at the facts surrounding the agency actions "as an
inclusive whole," and looking at both the pre-litigation and litigation
stages of the case, the District Court did take what Judge Kennelly
referred to as "guidance" from the Seventh Circuit decision and adopted
the appellate court opinion's factual findings. 40 Quoting from the factual
conclusions of the Court of Appeals, the District Court granted an award
of attorneys fees because the Court concluded that the government's
"position was unjustified in any of the three relevant respects: its factual
contentions lacked a reasonable basis in truth; its legal theory lacked a
reasonable basis in law; and there was no reasonable connection between
the facts it alleged and the theory it alleged.
' ' 1
Judge Kennelly's concluding comments suggest that he had as
little patience with what he noted the Court of Appeals had "charitably
characterized" as an extreme legal position, as had Circuit Judge Posner a
few months earlier:
The government says that "before this case, no
court had ever denied a request by EPA for access to
conduct response actions under CERCLA based on a
determination that EPA's proposed actions were
unjustified." . . . The government's contention seems to be
that unless some court has specifically ruled a particular
course of action baseless, it is entitled to take the bit in its
teeth and run roughshod over any citizen who happens to
lie in its chosen path and should have no reason to expect
that the courts will have anything to say about it. Claims of
this type do not well suit a government of constitutionally
limited powers, charged with respecting and protecting the
fundamental rights of its citizens.
The government's position, had it been accepted ...
in effect writing judicial review out of the statute--can in
no way be characterized as reasonable. The fact that it had
not been rejected in any case is an indication not of its
40 United States v. Tarkowski, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19438 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
41 Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).
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reasonableness but rather that government officials in this
country, thankfully, tend to be disinclined to take
unsupportable positions that impair the rights of its
citizens. When they do so, however, they cannot justifiably
expect that the courts are powerless to rein them in.42
A. Summary of Case Law Before Tarkowski
Several decisions in the years before the Seventh Circuit's recent
evaluation of the reasonable and lawful scope of the EPA's site access
authority in Tarkowski offer instruction and guidance on both the agency
interpretation of its statutory authority, and the extent to which the courts
were willing to accede to the EPA assertions of a need to demand a strict
right to site access. In United States v. David B. Fisher,43 the same Circuit
and the same Judge came to quite different conclusions than those reached
in Tarkowski. In this instance, a farmer and the EPA disagreed about the
EPA's right for access to a 230 acre tract, mostly farmland, which had
previously been used in part for reclamation of solvents. The EPA was
concerned that hazardous waste had leaked into the groundwater from
some of 700 to 1,000 drums in which reclamation wastes were stored, and
which had been buried under the farm. The farmer's contractor, hired to
bury the drums, told the EPA that the farmer told him to puncture as many
drums that he could when burying them, and that he had done so.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this decision is that it was
also by the Seventh Circuit, and was also written by Judge Posner, who
was also the author of the Court's opinion in Tarkowski. However, in the
context of the facts presented by the farmer, the contractor and the EPA in
the Fisher circumstances, Judge Posner was much more willing to allow
the agency a far broader right to insist on site access.
In Fisher, the farmer argued that he had been denied "due process"
because the District Judge had failed to read all of the farmer's
"voluminous filings" before deciding to issue an access order.44 The
District Judge had admitted that he had not read those filings. However,
Judge Posner concluded that this constitutional argument was "shallow"
because CERCLA, as amended by SARA, required the District Court to
42 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
43864 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1988)
44 Id. at 438.
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grant the EPA site access. 45  The only requirement, according to Judge
Posner in 1988, was that the Agency demand for access be grounded in a
"reasonable basis to believe there may be a release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance" and that the agency demand for access to a site also
not be "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. ' 46 The Court determined, on the basis of the
statutory authority given to the EPA by the statutory SARA changes, and
after observing that these statutory access provisions were more
"draconian" than the corresponding provisions authorizing agency access
in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), that when
access is denied and the EPA turns to the district court for an access order,
"the district court to which the EPA applies shall mete out whatever
equitable relief is necessary to prevent interference with the agency's
entering.
4 7
Judge Posner concluded that the SARA access requirements
established an "undemanding standard" that under the facts presented to
the Court, was "amply satisfied" not only by what the EPA Project
Manager saw and smelled (discarded waste drums, stained soil and
distressed vegetation), but also by the proximity of the main site to the
farm, the fact that the farm had been used to store wastes from the main
site, and the listing of the main site property high on the EPA National
Priorities List.48 All of these facts, the Court felt, "gave ample reason to
believe that further investigation of the farm might be necessary for the
protection of human health."49  As Judge Posner put it, referring to the
assertion that the District Judge should have read Fisher's pleadings and
filings more deeply, "Judge Zagel was wise to save his time and energy
for cases in which a study of the factual record might make a
difference." 5
0
Likewise, Judge Posner rejected the farmer's argument that the
access order violated the takings clause because it placed no limit on what
the EPA could do to the farm. Judge Posner concluded that the takings
45 Id.
46 Id. at 437. In identifying this standard, Judge Posner directly referred to and cited the
statutory access requirements set out at 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (e)(5)(B)(i) (1994).
47 Id.
48 Id.
4 9 United States v. David B. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1988)
50 Id.
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argument was both "premature" and "frivolous."5' He based this
conclusion on the fact that there was "no indication that the EPA is
engaging in or has plans to engage in activities on the farm that would be
so disruptive as to constitute a taking of the property."52 Judge Posner
further noted that should that happen, the farmer would then have a
monetary remedy in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker
Act.53 Again, he referred to Hendler and added that this remedy would be
exclusive, citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 5
4
In another case, which was proceeding through the courts at the
same time as Tarkowski, District Judge Molloy authorized the EPA access
to a site, but also observed that if the related the EPA response action
would effect a permanent physical occupation of the property, depriving
the landowner of other uses, just compensation would be due.55 In this
instance, the EPA sought access to an abandoned asbestos mine and the
landowner objected because the EPA planned to dispose of asbestos-
contaminated soils on the property. The landowner claimed that the EPA
was obligated to acquire the property before being allowed to make such a
deposit.
The landowner in Grace argued that the EPA had no "need" to
enter the property because alternative landfill sites were available for
disposal.56 The Court emphasized that the EPA is "entrusted by Congress
and the President with responsibility for taking actions that usually feature
a considerable degree of discretion," and responded to the landowner's
claim that the EPA had not demonstrated a "need" to enter the property by
announcing that it would not permit the landowner to "quibble about
whether the agency needs access," because the EPA has a considerable
degree of discretion and "the EPA's discretion should remain as unfettered
as possible."5
7
Looking at the five element test that the EPA must establish to
entitle the agency to an order mandating access, 58 the Court next
51Id.
52 Id. at 438-39 (citing Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91 (1986)).
53Id. at 439.
54Id. (citing Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91 (1986) and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984)).
55United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Mont. 2001).
56/d. at 1187.
Id.
58 These five elements were noted and discussed earlier in this Article at pages 753-55.
766 [Vol.26:749
REGULATORY ACCESS TO CONTAMINATED SITES
considered whether the defendants had obstructed the EPA's right of
entry. Here the focus was an argument that has come up in other access
disputes as well.59 The defendant argued that they might not have a right
to assert a takings claim under the Tucker Act if it "voluntarily" granted
the EPA access. They similarly asserted that because they "have to
obstruct access to preserve their rights," they should not be subject to the
imposition of the $27,500 a day penalty available to the EPA under the
statute.
61
59 In the administrative proceedings that arose prior to the United States bringing a
CERCLA-based suit for cost recovery against a Florida landlord, Continental Equities,
United States v. Continental Equities, Inc., Case #99-619-CIV-SEITZ/GARBER (S.D.
Fla.) (Closed by Administrative Order dated Feb. 20, 2002, based on a Consent Decree
entered Feb. 6, 2002), the EPA, using the standard agency Access Authorization form,
requested site access to property owned by Continental Equities, some of which was at
the time leased to third parties. In the request for Access Authorization, EPA referred to
its access guidance Directive, and used the form in that guidance. Continental Equities
objected to a "voluntary" grant of access to EPA and to EPA contractors for well
installation and testing, out of concern that in doing so Continental Equities might be
waiving its later right, under the Tucker Act, to claim compensation for the taking of its
property, or might be assuming liability to third parties or to EPA contractors if under
Florida law the contractors were treated as invitees or licensees. Continental Equities also
requested EPA or EPA-contractor indemnification for any injuries to Continental Equities
or to its tenants caused by the contractors, as well as evidence that the contractors had
insurance that could provide such protection.
In response to Continental Equities' refusal to execute the Access Authorization
form, and its insistence on indemnification and insurance, EPA told Continental Equities
that "conditioning" access in this fashion amounted to a denial of access. As threatened
at the time of the previous Access Authorization request, Region IV of EPA then issued
an administrative order pursuant to Section 104(e)(5) of CERCLA, determining as a
matter of law that Continental Equities had refused to grant access, and ordering access to
be available for at least a six year period. In the Matter of Continental Equities, Inc.,
EPA Docket No. :00-04-C (Region 4) (Nov. 19, 1999). The Unilateral Administrative
Order obligated Continental Equities to advise EPA whether Continental Equities
intended to "comply" with the Order. In response to this requirement, Continental
Equities wrote EPA that the company would "unconditionally abide by the terms" of the
Order, and would not impede or bar EPA or EPA contractors from having site access. In
the same letter, however, Continental Equities reiterated its position that its response
should not be construed as a "consent" to access, citing the same reasons that had
previously been raised by EPA. The issue was finally resolved by the Consent Decree
associated with settlement of the cost recovery litigation, in which Continental Equities
reserved some rights to pursue claims where there was a statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity.
60 W.R. Grace & Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
61 Id.
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Judge Molloy had little patience with this interpretation. In terms
of the claim that this need should protect the defendants from the statutory
penalty, he determined that such a construction would leave the penalty
provision "meaningless." 62 Instead, he concluded that CERCLA places
the burden on the EPA to show its authority for any access request, but
likewise also compels those "who disagree with the EPA's authority to
carefully analyze the agency's position. ' '63  In its summary of the
statutorily created dichotomy, the opinion also acknowledged that in some
circumstances "just compensation" would be due:
CERCLA also compels those who disagree with the EPA's
authority to carefully analyze the agency's position. If the
agency does not meet the statutory requirements, it may
safely be opposed. If it follows the statute, Defendants face
the consequences of an errant analysis. If the agency's
proposed action effects a permanent physical occupation
that deprives the landowner of other uses for the property,
just compensation will be due but that does not mean that
the EPA loses its statutory right of entry.
64
The comments by Judge Molloy did not directly reject the
Defendant's assertion that a "voluntary" acquiescence to the EPA access
would effect a denial of Tucker Act rights-nor could the Court do so
since the was no Tucker Act claim pending before the Court and since
Tucker Act claims would be tried through an action to be filed in the Court
of Federal Claims, not in a Federal District Court.65 However, certainly
the comments in the opinion demonstrate that the Court recognized that
even though it could properly grant an access order, the actions taken by
EPA could create the basis for a separate claim under the Tucker Act66
The second [Fifth Amendment] irony is that the Mine
Site's use as a disposal facility for Grace is precisely what
indicates the EPA's action might amount to a taking...
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1188.
64 Id.
65 See V.J. Scogin v. United States EPA, 1992 WL 10376 at *2 (E.D. La. 1992); United
States v. Mountaineer Refining Co., 886 F. Supp. 824, 829 (D. Wyo. 1995).
66 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982 ed.).
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The brash bargaining in this letter [a letter, cited earlier in
the footnote, where the Defendant asked for what it referred
to as "reasonable terms for activities related to EPA's
removal action"--listing items such as "just compensation
to the extent that EPA intends to dispose of remediation
wastes and hazardous substances" on the defendant's
property, as well as "appropriate assurances" from EPA
such as indemnification against any future liability arising
out of EPA's activities on the property] does not undermine
the fundamental principle that the EPA cannot appropriate
private property to public uses without paying the piper.
Granting the EPA's motion for an order directing access
also does not undermine that principle. 
67
In response to the landowner's constitutional claim, the Court
concluded that the EPA could be required to compensate the landowner if
there were a taking, citing the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.68 in
doing so, the Court noted the standard, drawn from the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council6 9
that to prevail in such a claim there would need to be a showing that the





In a decision many years before Tarkowski, a federal District Court
in Connecticut acknowledged that although access rights arising under
Section 104(e) of CERCLA might in some instances be limited if access
were sought for private parties, as contrasted to access for the EPA or the
EPA contractors, under other CERCLA provisions a court order allowing
access would be available.
7 1
In this case, the EPA came to the court seeking an order to allow
waste generators, which had entered into settlements with the EPA, access
to a landfill site owned by the Defendant (Murtha). The EPA wanted
access so that those private parties could comply with their settlement
consent order obligations, and could implement the remedy selected by the
67 W.R. Grace & Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 n.15 (emphasis added).
68 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5.
69 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
70 W.R. Grace & Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
71 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1988).
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EPA. The opinion notes that the EPA, in its pleadings and argument, had
acknowledged that Section 104(e) of CERCLA did not expressly authorize
an order requiring a landowner to permit private parties to enter a
hazardous waste disposal site. Instead, the EPA argued that such an order
was available based on Section 106(a) of CERCLA, as well as the court's
equitable powers. Judge Dorsey agreed with the EPA.
Under the provisions and broad wording of Section 106(a), the
Court observed that, "[T] here is no express restriction on the nature of
the relief authorized except as equity and the public interest may
require." 72 Furthermore, although a request for an access order predicated
on this Section would need to allege "imminent and substantial
endangerment," the Court determined that the requirement and language
of Section 9606(a) is not limited to emergency situations. There need not
be "actual harm" demonstrated, but instead a "threatened or potential
harm."73 Drawing from the what the Court saw as its traditional equitable
powers, citing one of the earliest CERCLA decisions, .S. v. Price,74 the
opinion held that "while the risk of harm must be 'imminent,' the harm
itself need not be."75 In fact, it could be many years before that was
realized. Furthermore, Judge Dorsey was willing to grant the EPA a wide
range of latitude in public health issues, seeming to recognize the contrast
between the complexity of the CERCLA cleanup process and the
importance of any threat to public health.76
Similarly, in an opinion two years later, a federal court in New
Jersey made clear that when a state environmental agency was seeking
access to a site, predicated on CERCLA's Section 104 authority, the
Congressional history related to the enactment of CERCLA, and to the
72 Id. at 94.
73Id. at 96 (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192
SW.D. Mo. 1985)).
4 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982).
75 Id.
76 The opinion observed as follows on this contrast:
Given the importance of any threat to the public health and the reality
that implementation of a remedial plan might take years, "imminence"
in the pollution abatement context must be considered in light of the
time it may take to prepare administrative orders or moving papers to
commence and complete litigation and to permit issuance, notification,
implementation, and enforcement of administrative or court orders to
protect the public health.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 697 F. Supp. at 96 (citing United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (D. Minn. 1982)).
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1986 changes to Section 104, emphasized a clear emphasis on prompt and
immediate clean up. Accordingly, even where there might later be
compensation claims, to facilitate immediate response to contamination,
access to allow remediation "should be granted first, and compensation
should be determined later to avoid any delays."
77
The Court held that under CERCLA, the New Jersey EPA was not
required to show irreparable harm in order to obtain a preliminary
injunction order granting it access to land adjacent to a landfill, finding
that "the plain language of CERCLA suggests that Congress did intend to
displace the equitable standards that a court would apply in most
instances, '78 basing this finding on the specific language of Section
104(e). The Court interpreted Section 104(e), 42 U.S.C. Section
9604(e)(5)(B), to require that a court must issue an injunction when the
EPA or State agency has "a reasonable basis to believe" there may be a
threat of release of a hazardous substance.79 In the opinion of District
Judge Brotman, the court has no discretion whether to issue an order under
these circumstances.
The opinion also determined that for access authority, Section
104(e) draws no distinction between properties containing hazardous
substances and those that are merely adjacent to such properties. In
reaching this conclusion, the New Jersey court in Briar Lake Development
relied on an earlier interpretation of the scope of Section 104(e) in United
States v. Charles George Trucking Co. 
8 0
In Charles George Trucking, the EPA sought access to both a
hazardous waste dump and to adjacent land. After a detailed review of
legislative history, Judge Woodlock concluded that no distinction is drawn
in the statute between adjacent and source properties, adding that "if entry
upon an 'adjacent property' is needed to effectuate an otherwise
authorized response activity on a source property, such entry is authorized
under § 9604(e). To adopt the distinction .... would be to run the risk of
rendering the statutory right of entry ineffectual. The § 9604(e) right of
entry is a right to implement effective remedies."81
77 New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Briar Lake Dev. Corp., 736 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D.N.J.
1990).
78 Id. at 66.
79 Id.
80 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988)).
81 Id. at 1273 (emphasis added).
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In this instance, there was no prior administrative order before the
EPA came to the federal district judge, requesting an order to prohibit
interference with entry. Judge Woodlock noted that although "numerous
courts [before] have apparently issued precisely the type of order" the
EPA was seeking, the case was one of first impression. 2 Although the
United States was able to point to those cases as earlier decisions where
there had been no prior administrative order of entry, because the
defendants challenged the "unarticulated assumption" [in the cases cited
by the government] that authority under § 104(e)(5) extended to any
situation where access had been denied, and was not limited to those
where there was first an administrative determination, Judge Woodlock
concluded that he needed to determine "whether the assumption is in
error."
83
The opinion outlined the steps that the EPA could take if consent
to entry were not voluntarily provided.84 When consent is not granted to
entry authorized by Section 9604(e)(3), the government can either obtain
an administrative order of entry and then go to the federal court for a court
order requiring compliance with the administrative order, or (based on
what the Court saw as the face of the statute) could proceed directly to
federal court to obtain an original court order enjoining interference with
an authorized request entry.8 5 Emphasizing the need for prompt response,
the opinion concludes that the government does not have to do both, but
that these were "optional routes to obtain compliance with legitimate
requests for entry." In detail, the opinion traces the legislative history of
CERCLA and the Section 104(e) changes to it, and concludes that
Congress was "giving the government the 'tools necessary for a prompt
and effective response' to the enormous problems of hazardous waste
disposal. 86
Other cases where Section 104(e) was used as the basis for a
request for access demonstrate that at least until recently, courts have
generally been willing to grant access if there was a demonstration of how
it related to the needed site assessment or remediation. The decisions also
point out that refusals to allow access, after being ordered to do so,
sometimes can result in the imposition of significant penalties. In United
82 Id. at 1266.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1267.
85 Id.
86 Charles George Trucking, Co., 682 F. Supp. at 1268.
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States v. Genzale Plating, Inc.8 7 the federal court confronted the task of
determining what a reasonable penalty would be where a landowner had
denied access. The Court identified at least five factors that should bear
upon the amount of the penalty:
1. The good or bad faith of the defendant;
2. The extent of injury to the public;
3. The defendant's ability to pay;
4. The desire to eliminate any benefits derived through
a violation; and
5. The necessity of vindicating the authority of the
enforcing party.
88
The court found that the defendants acted in bad faith by denying
the EPA access to a contaminated site. The court ordered the corporate
landholders to pay a $40,000 civil penalty for failure to comply with an
order granting the EPA access.
By contrast, in United States v. Taylor,89 the District Court
initially, in response to a request from the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR") for a fine after the landowner denied access
for 115 days, imposed a fine of $57,500 based on $500 per day of
noncompliance with the access order (compared to the DNR request for
$25,000 per day). The Sixth Circuit vacated the order and remanded the
case back to the District Court.90 After remand, District Judge Enslen
considered the five penalty factors noted in Genzale Plating, and also
evaluated five other factors set out by the Sixth Circuit in its order, which
were:
1. The extent and gravity of the landowner's
unreasonable conduct;
2. Any prior history of such conduct;
3. The degree of culpability involved;
4. The urgency of the state's need for access to the
site; and
87 807 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
88 Id. at 939.
89 1994 WL 695918 (W.D. Mich. May 18, 1994).
90 8 F.3d 1074 (6th Cir. 1993).
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5. The cost to the state of prosecuting the application
for an order in aid of execution.
However, it does not seem that all of these factors had the same
weight in the eyes of the District Judge. Notwithstanding the clear
emphasis of the Sixth Circuit's remand order, the Michigan DNR returned
to its plea for a fine based on a fine of $25,000 for the first day of
violation, and $1,000 for each of the remaining 114 days, or a total of
$139,000. 9' Although this was less than the original $25,000 per day
suggested by DNR, the District Court looked at most of the ten factors on
the list, concluded that all of the factors identified by the Sixth Circuit
"obviously have some bearing on the amount of the fine to be assessed,"
but then concluded that since there was no environmental emergency, and
since fine decision remained "very subjective," the denial of access should
not result in the "major" fine requested by Michigan.92 Instead, giving
great emphasis to the defendant's ability to pay a fine, the District Court
set it at $4,420, which was computed on the basis of $1,000 for the first
day and another $30 fine for each of the remaining 114 days during which
access was denied.93
In United States v. Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 9 4 the court
first considered an argument very similar to that put forth in Tarkowski
many years later. The EPA argued that the court was without jurisdiction
to review challenges to removal or remedial activities, because of Section
113(h).95 While generally agreeing with that interpretation of the
limitation imposed through Section 113(h), and acknowledging that it was
unable to examine any technical merits of an EPA CERCLA response
action, the court did conclude that notwithstanding this limitation, when
the EPA comes to a federal court and seeks court-imposed compliance
with an entry request, the court must consider the five statutory elements
previously noted in this Article.
96
The court in Northside Sanitary Landfill also considered what
would constitute the "interference" required as one of these five elements.
Noting that the term "interference" is not defined in CERCLA,
91 Taylor, 1994 WL 695918 at *3.
92 Id. at *5.
93 Id.
94 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,850 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
95 ld. at 20,851.
96 ,
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nevertheless based on what it saw as "overarching purpose" of
CERCLA-to achieve quick remedial action in the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites-the court concluded that the term should be "interpreted to
mean conduct which could delay the cleanup schedule." 97 The court noted
several other cases, including Charles George Trucking and United States
v. Long (discussed infra), where the opinions had not even discussed the
issue of "interference" because the defendants in those cases had all
"physically excluded., 98  T
In one of the earliest access cases after the SARA changes to
CERCLA, United States v. Long,99 the court considered how much
deference must be given to the EPA's determination that there was a
"release or threatened release" from a site. The EPA argued that except in
instances where a court could enter a finding that the EPA conclusion
concerning the threat of a release was "arbitrary and capricious," the court
has to simply "defer to EPA. '' ° In the EPA's view, once a court made a
determination that the EPA had a reasonable basis to believe that there
may be a release or a threatened release, the court may not, in the view of
the United States, condition the EPA's right of entry in any way
whatsoever. As in Charles George Trucking a year later and in Tarkowski
over a decade later, the EPA centered these arguments on the limited role
a court could exercise on the restrictions created by Sectionl 13(h).
In Long, the government moved for immediate access to property
that was listed on the on the National Priorities List. SARA authorizes the
EPA to have access to property for the purposes of undertaking
investigative, engineering, design, and remedial activities where the EPA
has a reasonable basis to believe that there may be a release or threat of a
release of hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant from the
property.' 0 ' The Court found that the EPA's reasonable basis
determination was not arbitrary or capricious.'0 2 The Court also enjoined




98 Id. at 20,852.
99687 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
100 !d. at 344.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 344-45.
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As is apparent (and in stark contrast to Tarkowski, probably
because in Tarkowski the courts were never convinced that the EPA had
any rational basis for its actions), District Judge Spiegel was willing to
give the EPA almost all of the deference the agency sought. The only
limits the opinion shows to be available to the defendants came from
Judge Spiegel's requirement that the EPA had to give oral or written
notice to defendants at least twenty-four hours before the time of the
initiation of the EPA activities on the defendant's property.1
0 4
In another recent case, considered by a different District Court at
about the same time as, but with significantly different facts than those in,
Tarkowski, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
appears to have had little trouble being able to conclude that the EPA
demonstrated a reasonable basis for the agency's belief that there could
have been a release. The City of New Orleans had delayed cleanup and
therefore had "interfered" with entry on the site by the EPA, and therefore
the EPA should receive an order eno the City from any further
interference with the EPA site 
access.
In this case, the EPA requested access to former municipal waste
landfill based on its reasonable belief that there could have been release or
threat of release of hazardous substances. During prior investigations the
EPA had discovered that soil at site contained numerous hazardous
substances. Analyzing the five-part test, and especially the requirements in
Section 104(e)(1) that for this authority to be exercised, there must be a
reasonable basis to believe that there may be a release or threat of release
of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant, the Court examined
the factual basis for the EPA belief. 106 The existence of hazardous
substances located at the site and the site's inclusion in the National
Priorities List was enough evidence for the court to conclude that the EPA
had this reasonable basis.' 0
7
The opinion also noted other cases, which held that reasonableness
requirements would be satisfied when: (1) the EPA site manager smelled
something and the site had been included in the National Priorities List;'0 8
or (2) the EPA demonstrated that a reasonable basis to believe that there
104 Id. at 345.
105 United States v. City of New Orleans, 86 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. La. 1999).
106 Id. at 582.
107 Id. at 584.
108 United States v. Mountaineer Refining Co., 886 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D.Wyo. 1995).
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could be a hazardous release in the future; 10 9 or (3) samples analysis
showed existence of hazardous substances." 1
0
III. CASE LAW REGARDING STATE ENVIRONMENTAL ACCESS STATUTES
In the absence of a uniform act defining procedures for access to
sites for the purpose of environmental assessment and remediation, as
expected there are wide variations from state to state as to what is allowed,
and where limits are imposed. However, despite this diversity, it might be
helpful to look at some of the state variations, and the way they have been
construed by their state courts.
A. California
In Jacobsen v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,"' the California
Supreme Court examined the extent of entry onto private lands permitted
by a state statute. Whatever entry into or examination of private lands is
permitted by California Code Civ. Proc. § 1242, the Court concluded that
this entry or examination cannot amount to anything more than innocuous
entry and superficial examination that would suffice for the purposes of
the entry and which would not seriously impinge upon or impair the rights
of the owner to use and enjoy his property. Although this case does not
involve an environmental agency, the court's interpretation of the
California statute may be helpful in predicting how a court would interpret
a similar situation with a state environmental agency.
In this case, the agency regulating municipal water districts
requested permission of local landowners to enter their properties for the
purpose of determining whether or not there was rock under the property
suitable for building dams. The testing would involve drilling holes in the
property about five inches in diameter and 150 feet deep as well as
excavating pits measuring up to six feet wide and fifteen feet deep. The
agency estimated that it would take four men approximately sixty days to
-complete this testing. The court found that compelling the landowners to
109 United States v. Northside Sanitary Landfill, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,850, 20,851 (S.D.
Ind. 1988).
110 In the Matter of Venus Labs., Inc., 1990 WL 172583 *1 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Ill 219 P. 986 (Ca. 1923).
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submit to this type of entry without compensation would amount to a
taking and be unconstitutional."12
B. Ohio
After obtaining an administrative search warrant from the trial
court, the Ohio EPA entered onto the property of the Ross Incineration
Service. The owner then requested a temporary restraining order, which
was denied. The owner filed a motion to quash the warrant, which was
denied, by the trial court. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District,
held that a property owner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to quash
the warrant. The court also held that under the applicable state statute,
R.C. § 3734.07, there is a statutory procedure granting the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency discretion in seeking an access warrant
and in the imposition of, as well as judicial discretion in issuing a warrant
and in the imposition of costs. The same statute further provides that if
the landowner is successful in its challenge to a warrant, any costs of the
entry and warrant imposed on the landowner must be reviewed.' 3
C. New York
In general, entries onto private property made by the state and its
agencies for the purpose of making surveys and examinations are not
takings of property in the constitutional sense. 14 A New York Supreme
Court decision found that allowing such entry was constitutional because
New York law also requires that any damage to private property done in
the process of surveys or examinations must be compensated by the
state. 1 '5 In King, employees of the Power Authority entered upon the
Plaintiff's land and dug holes, blasted, cut trees and other vegetation. The
Plaintiff claimed that this entry constituted a taking without compensation.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim, relying upon New York Public
Authorities Law Section 1007 subd. 8, allowing entry onto private
property for purposes of survey and examination.
112 See generally id.
113Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Ross Incineration Servs., Inc., 579 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989).
114 New York Public Authorities Law § 1007, subd. 8.
115 King v. Power Auth., 353 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
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Another state environmental agency case from New York is Juliano
v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management. 16 This case
involved plaintiffs who sought "just compensation" for monitoring wells
and piezometers remaining on their land after testing was completed.' 17 In
terms of some of the language used in the EPA "consent for access"
document appended to this Article, and because of its analysis of the
primary federal decision in the area of site analysis, access and takings
law, the Hendler decision, discussed below, the Juliano case warrants
closer attention than perhaps do many state court opinions on these
subjects.
In this case, the plaintiffs owned 166 acres of land that they
purchased in 1987 to operate a shooting and hunting club. The defendant
in the case was a New York Public Authority created to establish a solid
waste facility in the county where the land was. The Authority's powers
included the power to condemn. The plaintiffs signed a "Testing
Agreement," paying them $1000 for granting the Authority the right to
enter and to test their property. Well installation and testing went on for
almost three years, and by that point there were 24 monitoring wells and 8
piezometers left in the property."18 The Authority at that point told the
plaintiffs that no decision about the location of the landfill could be made
for a few more years, and told them that if the property were acquired, the
plaintiffs would be compensated. The Authority also admitted that if the
project were abandoned, they would be obligated to compensate the
plaintiffs for any damage to their property, as required by the Testing
Agreement. 1
19
Chief Judge McAvoy identified two takings issues. The first was
whether the wells and piezometers left in the property constituted a
"permanent physical occupation" requiring just compensation. The
second was the designation of the property as a potential site for a regional
landfill constituted a regulatory taking requiring just compensation. In
a footnote, the opinion acknowledges that all takings law is based on the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that analysis
(starting with the Pennsylvania Coal case, discussed below) needs now to
116 983 F. Supp. 319 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
117 Id. at 322.
118 Id.
119Id. at 328.
120 Id. at 323.
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consider both of the two distinct theories of liability, physical occupation
and regulatory takings.121
As far as a regulatory takings-based claim was concerned, since
there had been no decision on whether to use the plaintiffs property, or
even to build a landfill, the Court determined that the claim was not ripe
for judicial review, and therefore was dismissed.
Next, the Court considered the issue of permanent physical
occupation and the takings consequences of that. Alluding to the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Yee v. City of Escondido,122 the Court
recognized that if the government had committed or authorized a
permanent physical occupation of property, "the Takings Clause generally
requires compensation." 123 Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier
1982 decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 124
Judge McAvoy further acknowledged that where there is such a
permanent, physical occupation, there is a per se taking, "without regard
to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner."125
But the opinion goes on to lament the inconsistencies of takings
theories, and the absence of clear guidance where a court confronts what
has come to be termed "temporary physical takings:"
In summary, where the governmental action consists of a
permanent physical occupation, a per se taking exists.
Conversely, where the governmental action is not physical
and permanent, a multi-factor balancing test is required.
See, e.g. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) [citations omitted]. Takings
jurisprudence has thus evolved into two distinct branches
that purport to protect the same right but use tests that share
virtually no common elements. 126  However, by
121 Id. at 323 n.3.
122 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
123 Id. at 522.
124 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
125 Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
126 In footnote five, the opinion observes that the apparent inconsistencies and
contradictions between the two branches of takings law have not escaped comment by
academics, citing specifically Dennis H. Long, The Expanding Importance of Temporary
Physical Takings: Some Unresolved Issues and an Opportunity for New Directions in
Takings Law, 72 IND. L. J. 1185 (1997).
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abandoning the multi-factor balancing test in favor of a per
se rule, the physical occupation branch of takings
jurisprudence has overlooked an important subspecies of
physical takings: the temporary physical taking.
Unfortunately, this appears to be precisely the issue
presented here.1
27
The opinion notes the dilemma created by the Loretto opinion's
conclusion that permanent physical occupations are takings "even if they
occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously
interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his land"'128 (as appears to
be the situation with the Authority's intrusion). It also recognizes the
problem, raised and strongly criticized in Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Loretto, that there is no precise definition developed for what is meant by
the term "permanent.'
129
The Juliano decision then proceeded to examine what it felt to be,
since Loretto, the only reported case to try to clarify what was
"permanent," and the impact of that evaluation on whether there was a
taking, Hendler v. United States,130 Since the facts and analysis in Hendler
are discussed below, they are not repeated here. However, it is significant,
as recognized by the opinion, that both the Juliano and the Hendler cases
involved very similar facts related to wells that had been installed and
maintained by a governmental agency that had entered a private
landowner's property.
Chief Judge McAvoy was critical of both the Hendler analysis and
with its reliance on precedent that the New York District Court felt not
only did not support the Hendler reasoning, but which actually undercut it.
He also concluded that some of the statements in Hendler about whether a
permanent physical occupation in all cases had to be exclusive or
continuous (Hendler said it did not' 31)' were in "clear conflict" with
Supreme Court precedent, particularly Loretto.132 Based on all of this, the
District Court in Juliano rejects what it believes to be "Hendler's
127 Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management, 983 F. Supp.
319, 325 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis added).
128 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430.
129 Id. at 448.
130 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (1991).
131 Id. at 1377.
132 Juliano, 983 F. Supp. at 327.
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contorted definition" of the term "permanent.' 33 Instead, the New York
District Court uses the dictionary definition of permanent-"intended to
exist or function for a long, indefinite period without regard to
unforeseeable conditions."'' 34 The District Court examines the details of
what will be required to decommission the wells and piezometers. 135
Then, applying the dictionary definition of "permanent," the Court
concludes that such procedures as the pressure injection of cement grout
would be permanent, and that therefore, as a matter of law, the Authority's
actions constituted a permanent physical taking entitling ,the Plaintiffs to
an award of just compensation.13 6 The exact amount of compensation was
a question of fact, and therefore was left for a jury to determine.' 37
D. Massachusetts
A Massachusetts statute allows the state to remove hazardous
waste and prevent further contamination.'3 8 However, public interest has
been held to take precedence over private property rights. In Nassr v.
Commonwealth, 3 9 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that the fact
that the state temporarily occupied private property near a contamination
site did not transform the state's actions through the exercise of police
power pursuant to Massachusetts's statute into the exercise of eminent
domain power under which the landowner would be entitled to
compensation. 140 In this case, the Plaintiff was completely barred from
the use of his property for eighteen months. However, the court found that
this action was not a taking because the court did not consider it an
eminent domain action under Massachusetts's statute. 141
E. New Jersey





138 M.G.L.A c. 21 § 27(14).
139 477 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1985).
140 Id. at 990.
141 Id. at 991.
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A New Jerse statute appears to be more inclusive with what it
defines as a taking.' 2 Case law relying upon this statute has interpreted
certain monitoring actions by the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") as physical takings. Because of this interpretation, the taking is
considered a taking per se, and does not depend .upon the size or extent of
the taking.143 In Rohaly, the DEP installed three groundwater monitoring
devices onto the Plaintiff's property to monitor contamination of the
surrounding areas. The court in this case found the size of the wells were
irrelevant as to the determination of whether this is a taking because
physical takings are takings per se under a New Jersey statute N.J.S.A.
20:3-1 to 20:3-50.1
44
IV. TAKINGS LAW-ITS INTERACTION WITH SITE ACCESS
A. History of Takings Law Prior to 1987
Prior to 1987, the United States Supreme Court was extremely
deferential to governmental agencies, and consequently often seemed
reluctant to label an agency's actions as a taking. In 1978, the Court
endorsed a series of factual inquires for determining a taking.1
45
Specifically, the Supreme Court's three-prong test included analyses of (1)
the character of the government action, (2) the economic impact of the
particular action on the property owner, and (3) the extent to which the
government action has interfered with distinct, investment-backed
expectations. 146 This test applied to the traditional understanding of a
taking-the physical entrance and use of an individual's land by the state
without compensation. Even with these clearly stated factors, the
Supreme Court, operating with the assumption that our properly
functioning democracy would not unjustifiably impose burdensome
regulation or enter onto another's land, was hesitant to find takings.
1. The Takings Triumvirate-1987
142 N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to 20:3-50.
143 Rohaly v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. & Energy, 732 A.2d 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999).
144 Id. at 526.
145 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
146 Id. at 124.
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However, three decisions in 1987 revealed a more critical stance
by the Supreme Court. First, in a case by heirs of members of the Sioux
Tribe, the Court found that the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983,
Section 207, effected a taking that required just compensation. 147 In this
case, the Court systematically attacked the Section of the Act by adhering
to the three-prong test articulated in Penn Central. Ultimately, the Court
rested its recognition of a taking on the character of the government action
and the economic impact on the plaintiffs. 148 In its analysis the Court also
rests its decision on the Act's restraint of a fundamental right of
property-alienation. 1
49
Less than a month later, the Court found another taking.' 50  The
Court invalidated a condition of public access to property in exchange for
a rebuilding permit. The Court found that the character of such a
restriction did not "substantively advance" a legitimate state interest.151
While the state of California may have a legitimate interest in beach
access, conditioning rebuilding permits on such access without just
compensation oversteps the regulative capacity of the State. 1
52
The Court also found a regulatory action by the government to be a
taking in another 1987 case.' 53 This case reasserted the doctrine that in
147 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
148 Id. at 714-17.
149 Id. at 717.
150 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
151 Id. at 834.
152 Id. at 841-42.
153First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
322 (1987) (holding that regulatory ordinance that prohibited building on property
already owned by plaintiff constituted a taking). In its decision a few months ago in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct.
1465 (2002), the United States Supreme Court may have narrowed the impact of First
English. By a 6-3 majority the Court determined that a 32 month moratorium on
development in the Lake Tahoe Basin, while a comprehensive land-use plan was
formulated, did not constitute a regulatory taking under the approach taken in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
With respect to First English, Justice Stevens, after noting that "First English was
certainly a significant decision," and further claiming that "nothing we say here today
qualifies its holding," concluded that First English had decided a "compensation
question" or a "remedial question," (referring to 482 U.S. at 311, 313 and 318) and did
not address the "quite different and logically prior question whether the temporary
regulation at issue had in fact constituted a taking." Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
122 S. Ct. 1482 (emphasis added). The three dissenting Justices (Rehnquist, Thomas and
Scalia) apparently viewed the holding of First English differently, since they felt that in
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addition to the typical notion of a governmental taking by eminent
domain, the regulation of property can potentially constitute a taking.'
54
Specifically the Court, analyzing the status of temporary interference with
the use of property--"temporary takings," concluded that temporary
takings are not different from permanent takings in their effect and
requisite compensation.1
55
2. The Branching Structure of Takings Law
Historically, takings law has been roughly divided into two types
of cases: the traditional notion of a taking as a permanent, physical
occupation of land ("physical taking") and the regulation of property until
it is of worthless value ("regulatory taking"). 1 6 As noted earlier (in
connection with the discussion of the New York Federal District Court
decision in Juliano) recent case law, however, has suggested a third
branch-the "temporary physical taking."
Although it probably does not rise to the dignity of a fourth branch,
the circumstances usually present when an environment regulatory agency
enters a site for contamination assessment or remediation present an
interesting overlap of both physical and regulatory taking. Clearly the
agency or its contractors are physically on the property to drill wells,
sample or even to remove contaminated material. How long they will
need to be there depends entirely on the nature and extent of the of the
contamination, and on the techniques used to analyze and respond to it.
Yet, at the same time, the agencies in their justification of why they need
to enter and to remain rely on their regulatory and police power authority.
As can be seen from the comments below, whether a reviewing court
evaluates the entry as a physical taking or as a regulatory taking can have
a major impact on the recoverability of any damages from that entry.
B. Physical Taking: Physical Deprivation as a Per Se Taking
First English the Court had rejected any requirement that there be a "taking of 'the parcel
as whole"'-another point where the majority in Tahoe felt otherwise (see, e.g. id.)-
and instead had held that "temporary and permanent takings 'are not different in kind,'
when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of his land." Id. at 1492 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
154 Id. at 316; see also Penn. Cent. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
155First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19.
156 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992).
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In 1871, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. expanded the notion of a
physical taking beyond that of the traditional formal action of eminent
domain. 157 Here, the Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause of the
Wisconsin Constitution demanded compensation for the physical
deprivation of plaintiff's property resulting from the construction of a dam
that continuously flooded plaintiff's property. Specifically, the Court
reasoned that, regardless of the public benefit, such permanent deprivation
was aper se taking demanding compensation.
158
In its more recent and oft-cited decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,159the Court stated that "[i]n general (at least with regard
to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation." 160
Where the government must act to remedy a nuisance, courts have
been willing to create an exception to this per se rule.16 1 The United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council does not appear to recognize that "when the government
physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public
purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner
regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel
or merely a part thereof."' 162 If a court is willing to regard a regulatory or
governmental action as a physical taking of a possessory interest, then
even after Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council it appears that a per se
taking will exist.
C. Regulatory Taking: Regulation Subject to a Factual Analysis to
Determine Whether a Taking
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court explained, "the
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
157 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
158 Id. at 181.
159 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
160 Id. at 1015.
161 See Aztec v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
162 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S.
Ct. 1465, 1478 (2002).
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extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'163 Over
fifty years later, the Court adopted the three-prong test for determining
whether a regulation had gone "too far."' 64 However, as articulated in
Lucas, if a regulation destroys the total economic value of the property,
then the deprivation may be treated as a taking per se.1
65
D. Temporary Physical Taking. The Uncertain Standard
In Loretto, the Court distinguished a physical invasion from the
more traditional physical occupation or permanent taking. 166 Later in the
opinion, the Court states, "such temporary limitations are subject to a
more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a
taking."'167 But, this language was part of the dicta of the Court. The
Court still has not specifically addressed this issue.
However in one of the appellate decisions in Hendler v. United
States,'68 the court suggested that the per se rule may be applicable.' 69
Specifically, the Hendler court said that all takings are temporary in the
sense that the government agencies can change their minds at a later
time.170 Further, the court observed both of the following characteristics
when evaluating what might make a taking "temporary" or "permanent:"
Permanent does not mean forever, or anything like
it. A taking can be for a limited term-what is "taken" is,
in the language of real property law, an estate for years,
that is, a term of finite duration as distinct from the infinite
term of an estate in fee simple absolute ....
If the term temporary has any real world reference
in takings jurisprudence, it logically refers to those
governmental activities which involve an occupancy that is
transient and relatively inconsequential, and thus properly
163 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
164Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
165 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
166 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (arguing that physical invasion cases are "special").
167Id. at 435 n. 12.
168 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (1991).
169 See id.
170 Id. at 1376.
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can be viewed as no more than a common law trespass
quare clausum fregit.
17 1
Additionally, the court declared that the three-prong test of Penn
Central applied to regulatory takings and had no relevance to a cause of
action premised on an actual physical occupancy.
172
Notably, in Scogin v. United States (discussed below), the Federal
Claims Court cited both Hendler and Loretto when saying that the broader
Penn Central analysis applies when a physical intrusion does not amount
to a permanent physical occupation, but merely a "transient and relatively
inconsequential" physical presence. 1
73
V. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ACCESS LAW-
ALMOST TO THE POrNT WHERE THERE CAN BE A COMPENSABLE
TAKING
The intruder who enters clothed in the robes of authority in
broad daylight commits no less an invasion of these rights
than if he sneaks in in the night wearing a burglar's mask.
In some ways, entry by the authorities is more to be feared,
since the citizen 's right to defend against the intrusion may
seem less clear. Courts should leave no doubt as to whose
side the law stands upon.'74
As is probably evident from the frequent references to it thus far, at
the present time the Hendler case probably is the most relevant, at least at
the federal level, in any effort to claim that regulatory site access can
amount to a taking. As seen from cases like Juliano, the claim of a taking
does not come, usually from mere access, but instead most often surfaces
171 Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1376. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York, in a 1997 opinion written by Chief Judge McAvoy, in Juliano v.
Montgomery-Otsego-Schohaire Solid Waste, 983 F. Supp. 319, 327 n.7 (1977),
characterized the Hendler terminology and criticized its lack of a rational definition of
terms, as "creative use of language" that "calls to mind Lewis Carroll's famous passage:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what
I choose it to mean-neither more nor less," id. (citing and quoting from LEWIS
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 163).
172 Id. at 1381.
173 Scogin v. United States., 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 291-92 (1995).
174 Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
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when the access is, accompanied by longer term well placement, vehicle
storage, demobilization activities, or similar activities affecting a
landowner's right to use its property.
Hendler v. United Siates175 actually is a case that has generated
numerous decisions. The property involved is approximately 100 acres in
size, and is located in Southern California. The land was acquired for
investment, purposes in 1960, at a time when the area was largely
agricultural. The property is near a former rock quarry, which in the past
had been converted to use as a toxic waste disposal site. That site became
one of the more famous-probably infamous-sites involved in the
CERCLA program, as is still known as the Stringfellow Acid Pits site.
In 1983, the EPA, acting pursuant to CERCLA, approached the
owners of the Hendler property with a proposal that the EPA locate wells
and associated equipment on the Hendler location, to monitor the
movement of contaminated groundwater from Stringfellow. When
Hendler did not agree, the EPA issued an access order to allow both
federal and state officials to have access to the property for the purpose of
installing wells and testing the groundwater. 176 Over the next three years,
twenty wells were installed and maintained. Litigation based on the
original access order began in 1984 in the Claims Court, and the the EPA
terminated the order itself in 1994.'7
In their suit, the Hendler property owners claimed that entry onto
their land, and the installation of wells, constituted at "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment. The EPA moved to dismiss based on the plaintiffs'
failure to comply with discovery requests, and the Claims Court granted
the EPA's motion. In 1991, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in an
opinion written by Circuit Judge Plager, reversed the dismissal and
concluded that the trial court should have entered summary judgment for
the Plaintiffs on their physical taking claim, observing in the opinion that
"the Government behaved as if it had acquired an easement .... 178
As noted already the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals left open for
future fact-specific findings the issue of whether the character of the
governments actions and the plaintiffs investment-backed expectations,
might have created sufficient economic impact on the plaintiffs to amount
175 Id. at 1364.
176 See Hendler v. United States, 36 Fed. CI. 574, 576-579 (1996).
Id. at 580.
178 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1378 (1991).
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to a regulatory taking. However, the Court did proceed, applying the
traditional physical occupation theory, to determine that physical
occupation of property that is "adjudged to be of a permanent nature" is a
taking regardless of whether achieves a public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner.1
79
The Court then proceeded to consider what was a "permanent"
taking. Although, as already discussed, subsequent opinions and
commentators have criticized the character of the definition used, even
those comments rarely have questioned the Court's determination that
"there is nothing 'temporary' about the wells that the Government
installed on the plaintiffs property"-these wells were seen to be at least
as "permanent" as was the CATV equipment in Loretto.1
80
The Court said it was not necessary to define what duration makes
a physical presence a taking, because it felt the case before it is
"comfortably within the degree necessary to make out a taking."'' 1
In 1999, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals once again
considered Hendler's claims.' 8 2  Circuit Judge Plager also wrote this
opinion. The Court observed that a pivotal criterion for when there would
be a taking is the impact the regulatory imposition has had on the
economic use of the property.'8 3 The Court acknowledged that the value
of the property does not require a total wipeout of all regulatory use before
there would be a taking, but unless the facts and evidence establish some
negative economic impact, then there will be no regulatory taking.1
8 4
Although the Court had previously found a physical taking, it
denied and rejected the claim for compensation because the government's
taking of what the Court acknowledged was a well site and access corridor
easement resulted in a "special benefit" to the property owners which
outweighed the value of the easements.1 8 5 The Court also rejected the
claim that there had been a regulatory taking because "if the regulatory
action is not shown to have had negative economic impact on the property,
179 Id. at 1375.
180 Id. at 1376.
181 Id. at 1377.
182 Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374 (1999).
183 Id. at 1385 (citing Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564-65
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there is no regulatory taking."' 186 Here, the trial court had rejected the
claims of economic impact, and found that for purposes of measuring any
economic impacts, their land was already stigmatized by Stringfellow,
rather than by government action under the access order. 18 The Court of
Appeals did not consider the trial court factual findings to be clearly
erroneous, and therefore could not disturb those.'
88
There are two other federal cases of note, following and applying
the early Hendler analysis. In Scogin v. United States,' 89 the Claims Court
determined that when there was a physical intrusion, but not a permanent
physical occupation, then the Court was obligated to apply the broader
balancing Penn Central inquiry.1 90 As is often the situation, in the instant
case, the EPA went on the plaintiffs property to clean up a neighboring
CERCLA site.
Consistent with conclusions in some of the Hendler decisions, the
Court concluded that the EPA site access order, by itself, did not constitute
a taking. For there to be a taking, the EPA would first have to act on that
order.' 91 Based on the facts presented, the Court felt that the property
owner had consented to the entry, use, and occupation, thereby
relinquishing any claim for taking unless the agency oversteps the
boundaries of the original agreement. In the instant case, the plaintiff
failed to prove that the EPA did more than what was allowed in what the
Court considered, under the CERCLA standard, to be a valid access
agreement.
In McKay v. United States,'92 the Federal Claims Court of Appeals
considered a situation where multiple groundwater monitoring wells had
been drilled and maintained on federal land, but wells and their impact
extended into the plaintiff's separate underground mineral estate.
Therefore, the Court determined that there was a physical taking by the
government installing groundwater monitoring wells, even though the
wells were on federal land. The decision cites Lucas' observation that a
small intrusion and weighty public purpose still does not excuse the
186 Id. at 1385 (citing Florida Rock Indus., 18 F.3d at 1569-71 and Loveladies Harbor, 28
F. 3d at 1180).
187 36 Fed.C1. 574 at 588.
188 Hendler, 175 F.3d at 1378
189 33 Fed Cl. 285 (April 1995) and 33 Fed. Cl. 568 (June 1995).
190 33 Fed Cl. at 291-92.
33 Fed Cl. at 576.
192 199 F.3d 1376 (1999).
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government from its duty to compensate.193 Although this case had facts
similar to those in Hendler, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial
the appellate court felt that this invasion into the mineral estate was neither
isolated nor transitory, since multiple wells had been drilled and
maintained for several years. 194
A. The EPA 's Use of Consent Decree Language to Address These Issues
Perhaps in response to cases like these, or perhaps just as a result
of an increasing awareness by the EPA of the complexity of law with
respect to site access and to when site access demands might result in a
taking, in several recent consent decrees and draft decrees now in
negotiation, the EPA appears to have developed provisions to address, or
attempt to address at least, the takings and access issues already discussed.
It does not appear that the EPA has yet announced these provisions as a
part of a formal change in the Department of Justice "form" decree,
"Standard" provisions in almost any CERCLA consent decree
dealing with remediation include language to assure the EPA that it can
have the needed access, both at the site under remediation and in adjacent
properties where wells or soil sampling might be needed. A recent decree,
however, went further and provides as follows:
25. If the Site, or any other property where access
and/or land/water use restrictions are needed to
implement this RD/RA Consent Decree, is owned
or controlled by persons other than the Settling
Defendant, Settling Defendant shall use best efforts
to secure from such persons:
a. an agreement to provide access thereto for
Settling Defendant, as well as for the United
States on behalf of EPA, and the State, as
well as their representatives (including
contractors), for the purpose of conducting
any activity related to this Consent Decree
including, but not limited to, those activities
listed in Paragraph 24.a of this Consent
Decree [Paragraph 24.a identifies the
193 Id. at 1381.
194Id. at 1381-82.
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activities expected to occur as a part of the
RD/RA remediation, including tasks such as
well monitoring, obtaining samples, and
inspecting the progress of the remediation];
b. an agreement, enforceable by the Settling
Defendant and the United States, to abide by
the obligations and restrictions established
by Paragraph 24.b of this Consent Decree,
or that are otherwise necessary to
implement, ensure non-interference with, or
ensure the protectiveness of the remedial
measures to be performed pursuant to this
Consent Decree [Paragraph 24.b deals with
any interference with groundwater
monitoring, and includes a prohibition on
any installation or use of any drinking water
wells that would draw from the surficial
aquifer]; and
c. the execution and recordation in the Registry
of Deeds or other appropriate land records
office of County, State of
, of an easement, running with the
land, that (i) grants a right of access for the
purpose of conducting any activity related to
this Consent Decree including, but not
limited to, those activities listed in
Paragraph 24.a of this Consent Decree, and
(ii) grants the right to enforce the land/water
use restrictions listed in Paragraph 24.b of
this Consent Decree, or other restrictions
that EPA determines are necessary to
implement, ensure non-interference with, or
ensure the protectiveness of the remedial
measures to be performed pursuant to this
Consent Decree. The access rights and/or
rights to enforce land/water use restrictions
shall be granted to one or more of the
following persons: (i) the United States, on
behalf of EPA, and its representatives, (ii)
the State and its representatives, (iii) the
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
other Settling Defendants and their
representatives, and/or (iv) other appropriate
grantees. Within 45 days of entry of this
Consent Decree, Settling Defendant shall
submit to EPA for review and approval with
respect to such property:
(1) A draft easement, in substantially the
form attached hereto as Appendix D,
that is enforceable under the laws of
the State of Florida, free and clear of
all prior liens and encumbrances
(except as approved by EPA), and
acceptable under the Attorney
General's Title Regulations
promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. §
255; and
(2) a current title commitment or report
prepared in accordance with the U.S.
Department of Justice Standards for
the Preparation of Title Evidence in
Land Acquisitions by the United States
(1970) (the "Standards").
Within 15 days of EPA's approval and acceptance
of the easement, Settling Defendant shall update the
title search and, if it is determined that nothing has
occurred since the effective date of the commitment
or report to affect the title adversely, the easement
shall be recorded with the Registry of Deeds or
other appropriate office of Orange County. Within
30 days of the recording of the easement, Settling
Defendant shall provide EPA with final title
evidence acceptable under the Standards, and a
certified copy of the original recorded easement
showing the clerk's recording stamps.
26. For purposes of Paragraph 25 of this Consent
Decree, "best efforts" includes the payment of
reasonable sums of money in consideration of
access, access easements, land/water use
restrictions, and/or restrictive easements. If any
access or land/water use restriction agreements
required by Paragraphs 25.a or 25.b of this Consent
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Decree are not obtained within 45 days of the date
of entry of this Consent Decree, or any access
easements or restrictive easements required by
Paragraph 25.c of this Consent Decree are not
submitted to EPA in draft form within 45 days of
the date of entry of this Consent Decree, Settling
Defendant shall promptly notify the United States in
writing, and shall include in that notification a
summary of the steps that Settling Defendant has
taken to attempt to comply with Paragraph 25 of
this Consent Decree. The United States may, as it
deems appropriate, assist Settling Defendant in
obtaining access or land/water use restrictions,
either in the form of contractual agreements or in
the form of easements running with the land.
Settling Defendant shall reimburse the United States
in accordance with the procedures in Section XVI
(Reimbursement of Response Costs), for all costs
incurred, direct or indirect, by the United States in
obtaining such access and/or land/water use
restrictions including, but not limited to, the cost of
attorney time and the amount of monetary
consideration paid or just compensation.' 9
5
The following provision did not get included in the final decree-
but had been suggested in the negotiation process. The only two reasons
given for its deletion in the final draft were (1) the Department of Justice
was tired of negotiating, and the decree was presented (without this
provision) in a "take it or leave it" option and (2) some people at the
Department, involved in the review of the proposed decree, had questions
about the advisability of adding this kind of a "standard": 196
In making a determination as to whether to assist
Settling Defendant in obtaining access and/or land use
restrictions, the United States will consider the ability of
195 United States v. Drum Serv. Co. of Florida et al., Civ. No. 98-687-Civ-Orl.-28JGG
(excerpt from paragraphs 25 and 26 of the RD/RA Consent Decree for Settling Defendant
Drum Serv. Co. of Florida, entered by Judge Antoon on September 17, 2001).
196 Undated correspondence between author and the EPA (on file with author).
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the Settling Defendant to pay for such access and/or
restrictions at the time any request for assistance is made.
At the time the final decree provisions were being negotiated, the
Settling Defendant and its counsel requested some standards for what
might constitute the "reasonable sum" required to prove "best efforts"
under Paragraph 26. They were told that no more specific standards could
be offered, nor could the term of this part of the decree be limited, nor
could any type of "comfort letter" be given, because the determination of
whether the Settling Defendant had offered a "reasonable sum" for an
easement would depend on market conditions at the time of the offer. 197
Furthermore, even though the EPA and the Department of Justice
were unwilling or unable to include such language in the final decree, the
Settling Defendant was told that this language (had it been included) ought
to give that party some "comfort" that, if the market value of the easement
exceeded what the EPA/DOJ determined to be the ability to pay of the
Settling Defendant, the EPA would assist the Settling Defendant.' 98
Instead, the final decree language apparently leaves the determination of
what is a "reasonable sum" to the EPA, and further obligates the Settling
Defendant (as a Reimbursement Cost) to reimburse the United States for
whatever is needed to obtain the necessary access or land use/water use
restrictions. 1
99
Other "standard" provisions in any CERCLA consent decree are
covenants by various parties. There usually are mutual covenants not to
sue, but recently there have been some additions to those expected to be
given by a Settling Defendant. Two of these additions (highlighted below)
relate directly to a requirement that the Settling Defendant forego any
right to make the very claim which the cases discussed here have
concluded was the only remedy where there had been a taking-to bring
an action under the Tucker Act, or to make any claim under the United
States Constitution, or even to claim the benefits of any state statutory or
constitutional provision for compensation where there has been a taking.
The text of a Covenant Not to Sue (by the Settling Defendant) in a
recently entered consent decree reads as follows:
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88. Covenant Not to Sue. Subject to the reservations in
Paragraph 89, the Settling Defendant hereby
covenants not to sue and agrees not to assert any
claims or causes of action against the United States
with respect to the Site or this RD/RA Consent
Decree, including, but not limited to:
a. any direct or indirect claim for
reimbursement from the Hazardous
Substance Superfund (established pursuant
to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§ 9507) through CERCLA Sections
106(b)(2), 107, 111, 112, 113 or any other
provision of law;
b. any claims against the United States,
including any department, agency or
instrumentality of the United States under
CERCLA Sections 107 or 113 related to the
Site, or
c. any claims arising out of response activities
at the Site, including claims based on EPA's
selection of response actions, oversight of
response activities or approval of plans for
such activities.
d. any claims arising under the United States
Constitution, the Florida Constitution, State
law, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, or
common law, arising out of or relating to
past or future access to, imposition of deed
restrictions or easements, or other
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of
property owned or controlled by the Settling
Defendant; and
e. any claims for costs, fees or expenses
incurred in this action (including claims
arising under the Equal Access to Justice
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Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412) or
under any provision of State law.2°
VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO Go FROM HERE?
Based on the foregoing analysis, it should be apparent that both
state and federal regulatory agencies have a need and right to obtain access
to contaminated sites. Equally apparent is the fact that federal and state
law can impose some limitations on those agencies, although in many
instances the limitations can be quite limited. Furthermore, the
circumstances related to an agency's request for site access to
contaminated property are usually not driven by the agency looking for
some way to "harass" or interfere with a private property owner's rights,
but instead by a real agency belief that there is a contamination problem
which needs assessment, remediation or both.
Even so, in light of some of the issues which arose in the
Tarkowski litigation, as well as some of the other observations noted
earlier in this article, when a regulatory agency believes it has a need for
access, and when a property owner is confronted with an agency request
for access, where possible the interaction between the agency and the
landowner should include an early and clear explanation of the site and
environmental circumstances dictating the request, and the opportunity to
document this need for the landowner.
In the process of requesting access, regulatory agencies should try
to take into account some of the factors that the author identified earlier as
a more "rational and reasonable" approach to the issues confronting site
access requests. Some of these are included in the private party Site
Access and License Agreement form that is appended to this article.
However, counsel for private parties must recognize that many of the
mechanisms included in that form, such as indemnification or covenants to
pay the landowner's consultant and legal fees, are neither applicable to,
nor usually legally a part of, agreements with public regulatory agencies.
But, likewise, agencies should accept that landowners' requests for
having these issues addressed in the site access documentation are not
efforts to interfere with the agency performance of its job, or to delay the
access, but are instead recognition by the landowner that there are some
risks related to the access and to the agency or agency agents' and
200 United States v. Drum Serv. Co. of Florida et al., Civ. No. 98-687-Civ-Orl.-28JGG
(excerpt from paragraph 88 of the RD/RAConsent Decrees for Settling Defendant Drum
Serv. Co. of Florida entered by Judge Antoon on September 17, 2001).
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contractors' use of the property, that should not be imposed on the
landowner merely because it has "consented" to access.
Some, but not all, of these potential issues and requests would
include the following:
(a) Is there any insurance in place to cover the risks of
injury to the site and to those on and around it? Often the
agency contractors have been required to obtain such
protection as a condition to receiving their contract with the
agency. If there is such insurance in place, often the
contractors can very easily be able to include the landowner
in the policy's protection, perhaps even including the
landowner as an additional named insured.
(b) Can the access documents reflect agreement by the
agency that the landowner's "consent" to access should not
be construed, for state law lien or tort law purposes, as an
"invitation" to the agency or its contractors onto the
property, nor as work being done for or at the request of the
property owner? If the applicable state law has provisions
whereby a landowner can disavow lien liability for work
done at the direction of others, although done on the
landowner's property and with its "consent," can the access
documents include language to provide the landowner the
benefit of those?
(c) To the extent possible, can the scope of the work to
be performed on the property, and the area where there is a
right of access, be defined or limited in some way? Perhaps
there could an easement defined and actually granted to get
to where wells are to be placed or monitored? Perhaps wells
could be placed at locations that would minimize their
impact on the landowner's normal use of its property, or of
the property use by tenants. Although admittedly it is far
easier on the agency to define the area for which they need
access as the entire site, that broad-brush treatment can
create real issues and problems for the landowner. If the
property is encumbered with a mortgage, deed of trust or
existing restrictive covenants, the agency should be willing
to work with the landowner to assure, to extent feasible, that
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agency and agency contractor activities on the land do not
result in a violation of restrictions in those instruments.
(d) To the extent possible, can the document include
some realistic process to provide the landowner with notice
of when the agency or its agents and contractors expect to be
present, and how long they would expect they would need to
be at the site?
(e) Can the access documentation assure the landowner
that when there is no longer any need for access, wells will
be property closed, equipment removed, and the property
returned to the same condition, except for "normal wear and
tear" as it was in when access began? If there cannot be
such an assurance granted by the agency itself, can the
agreement include a provision whereby the agency will
agree to use its best efforts to have its contractors provide
such assurances, in writing, to the landowners?
(f) Can the document include some limit on its
duration, perhaps coupled with a practical process to extend
the term if needed?
(g) Can the document include some process whereby
the agency will provide the landowner with copies of the
data resulting from the sampling on its property? It should
not be necessary-as has been the case at some CERCLA
locations-for the landowner to have to file a Freedom of
Information Act request to be able to obtain these results.
The author recognizes that where the EPA, or state agencies acting
in conjunction with the EPA, are involved, those agencies must consider
the EPA and DOJ guidance on this issue (a copy of which is attached to
this article). Under that guidance, those agencies are expected to use the
"Consent for Access to Property" form that is a part of the guidance
memo, and which is also appended to this article. Unfortunately, that
form offers absolutely none of the assurances suggested by the list above.
Furthermore, to the extent that the EPA or state agency insists on use of
that form, negotiations can become unnecessarily antagonistic.
The author has had personal experiences with some EPA Regions,
where there have been varying degrees of insistence that there has to be
[Vol.26:749800
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"strict" adherence to the Guidance and to the use of the "Consent" form.
In other instances, state and EPA personnel have been more flexible and
have dealt with many of the issues listed above. Perhaps in connection
with the process of revising EPA guidance in connection with
requirements of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, an effort could be made to allow agency personnel
greater flexibility.
To the extent that agencies are able to work together with
landowners in this fashion, there would certainly be a decreased risk of the
situation getting to the point where the landowner demanded
compensation for a "taking." Furthermore, to the extent that these
procedures can be followed, circumstances such as those in Tarkowski can
certainly be avoided. The success of these efforts will assure the further
and future twists to this old tale.
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APPENDIX A*
Entry and Continued Access Under CERCLA
**************** DISCLAIMER ****************
The following electronic file contains the text of a policy issued by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This file has been
reformatted to make it available to you in electronic form. Formatting
(margins, page numbering, etc.) may be different than the original hard
copy to make the document more easily readable on your computer screen.
Where graphics have been removed, the editor has noted it in the text.
This electronic file is a courtesy copy of the official policy. If any
discrepancies are found, the file copy (hard copy original) which resides at
the U.S. EPA provides the official policy.
JUN 5 1987
OSWER Directive #9829.2






SUBJECT: Entry and Continued Access Under CERCLA
FROM: Assistant Administrator
TO: Regional Administrators I-X
Regional Counsels I-X
Appendix A consists of 4 documents: The Access Memorandum; the Disclaimer;
Exhibit A; and Exhibit B. All documents begin on their own separate pages within the
Appendix.
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INTRODUCTION
This memorandum sets forth EPA's policy on entry and continued
access to facilities by EPA officers, employees, and representatives for the
purposes of response and civil enforcement activities under CERCLA.' In
short, the policy recommends that EPA should, in the first instance, seek
to obtain access through consent. Entry on consent is preferable across the
full range of onsite activities. If consent is denied, EPA should use
judicial process or an administrative order to gain access. The appropriate
type of judicial process varies depending on the nature of the onsite
activity. When entry is needed for short-term and non-intrusive activities,
an ex parte, judicial warrant should be sought. In situations involving
long-term or intrusive access, EPA should generally file suit to obtain a
court order.
The memorandum's first section addresses the recently amended
access provision in CERCLA. The memorandum then sets forth EPA
policy on obtaining entry and the procedures which should be used to
implement this policy, including separate discussions on consent,
warrants, court orders, and administrative orders.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
EPA needs access to private property to conduct investigations,
studies, and cleanups. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA) explicitly grants EPA 2 the authority to enter property
for each of these purposes. Section 104(e)(1) provides that entry is
permitted for "determining the need for response, or choosing or taking
any response action under this title, or otherwise enforcing the provisions
of this title."
SARA also establishes a standard for when access may be sought
and defines what property may be entered. EPA may exercise its entry
authority "if there is a reasonable basis to believe there may be a release or
threat of a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant."
Section 104(e)(1). SARA, however, does not require that there be a
I This policy does not address information requests under Section 104(e)(2).
2 Although CERCLA and SARA confer authority upon the President that authority has
been delegated to the EPA Administrator. Exec. Order No. 12580, Section 2(g) and (i),
52 Fed. Reg. 1923 (1987).
2002]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
release or threatened release on the property to be entered.3 Places and
properties subject to entry under Section 104(e) include any place any
hazardous substance may be or has been generated, stored, treated,
disposed of, or transported from; any place a hazardous substance has or
may have been released; any place which is or may be threatened by the
release of a hazardous substance; or any place where entry is needed to
determine the need for response or the appropriate response, or to
effectuate a response action under CERCLA. Section 104(e)(3). EPA is
also authorized to enter any place or property adjacent to the places and
properties described in the previous sentence. Section 104(e)(1).
EPA is granted explicit power to enforce its entry authority in
Section 104(e)(5). Under that provision EPA may either issue an
administrative order directing compliance with an entry request or proceed
immediately to federal district court for injunctive relief. Orders may be
issued where consent to entry is denied. Prior to the effective date of the
order, EPA must provide such notice and opportunity for consultation as is
reasonably appropriate under the circumstances. If EPA issues an order,
the order can be enforced in court. Where there is a "reasonable basis to
believe there may be a release or threat of a release of a hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant," courts are instructed to enforce an
EPA request or order unless the EPA "demand for entry or inspection is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." Section 104(e)(5). The legislative history makes
clear that courts should enforce an EPA demand or order for entry if
EPA's finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe there may be a
release or threat of release is not arbitrary and capricious. 132 Cong. Rec.
S14929 (October 3, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Thurmond); 132 Cong. Rec.
H9582 (October 8, 1986) (Statement of Rep. Glickman). See United
States v. Standard Equipment, Inc., No. C83-252M (W.D. Wash.
November 3, 1986). In addition, a penalty not to exceed $25,000/day may
be assessed by the court for failure to comply with an EPA order or the
provisions of subsection (e).
Finally, Section 104(e)(6) contains a savings provision, which
preserves EPA's power to secure access in "any lawful manner." This
broad savings provision is significant coming in the wake of the Supreme
Court's holding that:
3 The House Energy and Commerce bill at one point contained this limitation. H.R. Rep.
No. 99-253 Part 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 158 (1985). This limitation, however, was
dropped prior to introduction of the bill for floor debate. See H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H10857 (December 4, 1985).
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When Congress invests an agency with enforcement and
investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify
explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the
course of executing the statutory mission.
Regulatory or enforcement authority generally
carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation
traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority
granted.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 90 L.Ed. 2d 226, 234 (1986). 4 One
lawful means of gaining access covered by this paragraph is use of
judicially issued warrants. See S. Rep. No. 99-11, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 26
(1985).
In numerous instances prior to the passage of SARA, EPA
obtained court rulin affirming its authority to enter property to conduct
CERCLA activities. Following enactment of SARA, several courts have
ordered site owners to permit EPA access. United States v. Long, No. C-
1-87-167 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 1987); United States v. Dickerson, No. 84-
76-VAL (M.D. Ga. May 4, 1987); United States v. Standard Equipment,
Inc., No.C83-252M (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 1986). Further, the one adverse
ruling on EPA's right of access has been vacated by the Supreme Court.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated,
93 L. Ed.2d 695 (1986).
EPA ACCESS POLICY
EPA needs access to sites for several types of activities, including:
preliminary site investigations;
4See also, Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2D 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 980 (1984) (EPA) authority to sample effluent under Section 308 of the Clean
Water Act broadly construed); CEDs, Inc. v. EPA, 745 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985).
5United States v. Pepper Steel and Alloy, Inc., No. 83-1717-CIV-EPS (S.D. Fla. October
10, 1986); Bunker Limited Partnership v. United States, No. 85-3133 (D. Idaho October
21, 1985); United States v. Coleman Evans Wood Preserving Co., No. 85-21 1-CIV-J-16
(M.D. Fla. June 10, 1985); United States v. Baird & McGuire Co. No. 83-3002-Y (D.
Mass. May 2, 1985); United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 22 ERC 1791, 15 ELR
20443 (D.N.M. April 18, 1985).
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Within each of these categories, the scope of the work and the time needed
to complete that work may vary substantially. This memorandum sets
Agency policy on what means should be used to gain access over the
range of these various activities.
EPA may seek access through consent, warrant, administrative
order, or court order. Consent is the preferred means of gaining access for
all activities because it is consistent with EPA policy of seeking voluntary
cooperation from responsible parties and the public. In certain
circumstances, however, the Region should consider obtaining judicial
authorization or issuing an administrative order in addition to obtaining
consent. For example, where uncertainty exists whether a site owner will
continue to permit access over an extended period, reliance on consent
alone may result in a substantial delay if that consent is withdrawn.
When consent is denied, EPA should seek judicial authorization or
should issue an administrative order. If the judicial route is chosen, EPA
may seek an ex parte warrant or a court order. Warrants are traditionally
granted for short-term entries. Generally, warrants should not be used
when the EPA access will involve long-term occupation or highly
intrusive activities. Clearly, warrants are appropriate for preliminary site
investigations. On the other hand, because of the long, involved nature of
remedial actions, access for such projects should be sought through a
request for a court order. Neither removals not RI/FSs, however, can be
rigidly matched with a given judicial access procedure. Depending on the
activities to be undertaken and the circumstances at the site, either a
warrant or a court order may be appropriate.
In deciding whether to use a warrant or a court order when access
is needed for a removal or to conduct a RIIFS, the following general
principles should be considered. First, if the activity will take longer than
60 days a court order normally is appropriate. Second, even if the activity
will take less than 60 days, when the entry involves removal of large
quantities of soil or destruction of permanent fixtures, a court order may
again be appropriate. Finally, warrants should not be used if EPA action
will substantially interfere with the operation of onsite business activities.
These issues must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
. If EPA needs to gain access for a responsible party who has agreed
to undertake cleanup activities under an administrative order of judicial
decree, EPA may, in appropriate circumstances, designate the responsible
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party as EPA's authorized representative solely for the purpose of access,
and exercise the authorities contained in Section 104(e) on behalf of the
responsible party. Such a procedure may only be used where the
responsible party demonstrates to EPA's satisfaction that it has made best
efforts to obtain access. A further condition on the use of this procedure is
that the responsible party agree to indemnify and-hold harmless EPA and
the United States for all claims related to injuries and damages caused by
acts or omissions of the responsible party. The responsible party should
also be advised that the expenses incurred by the government in gaining
access for the responsible party are response costs for which the
responsible party is liable. Before designating any responsible party as an
authorized representative, the Region should consult with the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring.
ACCESS PROCEDURES
A. Entry on Consent
1. General Procedures
The following procedures should be observed in
seeking consent:
Initial Contact. Prior to visiting a site, EPA
personnel 6 should consider contacting the site
owner to determine if consent will be forthcoming.
EPA personnel should use this opportunity to
explain EPA's access authority, the purpose for
which entry is needed, and the activities which will
be conducted.
Arrival. EPA personnel should arrive at the site at a
reasonable time of day under the circumstances. In
most instances this will mean during normal
working hours. When there is a demonstrable need
to enter a site at other times, however, arrival need
not be limited to this timeframe. Entry must be
reasonable given the exigencies of the situation.
6 As used in this guidance, the term "EPA personnel" includes contractors acting as
EPA's authorized representatives.
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Identification. EPA personnel should show proper
identification upon arrival.
Request for Entry. In asking for consent, EPA
personnel should state the purpose for which entry
is sought and describe the activities to be
conducted. EPA personnel should also present a
date-stamped written request to the owner or
person-in-charge. A copy of this request should be
retained by EPA. Consent to entry must be sought
from the owner7 or the person-in-charge at that
time.
If practicable under the circumstances, consent to
entry should be memorialized in writing. A sample
consent form is attached. Although oral consents
are routinely approved by the courts, a signed
consent form protects the Agency by serving as a
permanent record of a transaction which may be
raised as a defense or in a claim for damages many
years later. If a site-owner is unwilling to sign a
consent form but nonetheless orally agrees to allow
access, EPA should document this oral consent by a
follow-up letter confirming the consent. Since
EPA contractors often are involved in gaining
access in the first instance, the Regions should
ensure that their contractors are acquainted with
these procedures.
2. Denial of Entry
7 If EPA's planned site activities will not have a physical effect on the property, EPA
generally need not seek consent from the owner of leased property where the lessee is in
possession. The proper person in those circumstances is the lessee. But where EPA
entry will have a substantial physical effect on the property, both the lessee and the
property-owner should be contacted since in this instance interests of both will be
involved.
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If consent is denied, EPA personnel or contractors,
before leaving, should attempt to determine the
grounds for the denial. EPA personnel, however,
should not threaten the site owner with penalties or
other monetary liability or make any other remarks
which could be construed as threatening. EPA
personnel may explain EPA's statutory access
authority, the grounds upon which this authority
may be exercised, and that the authority may be
enforced in court.
3. Conditions Upon Entry
Persons on whose property EPA wishes to enter
often attempt to place conditions upon entry. EPA
personnel should not agree to conditions which
restrict or impede the manner or extent of an
inspection or response action, impose indemnity or
compensatory obligations on EPA, or operate as a
release of liability. The imposition of conditions of
this nature on entry should be treated as denial of
consent and a warrant or order should be obtained.
see U.S. EPA, General Counsel Opinions, "Visitors'
Release and Hold Harmless Agreements as a
Condition to Entry of EPA Employees on Industrial
Facilities," Gen'l and Admin. at 125 (11/8/72). If
persons are concerned about confidentiality, they
should be made aware that business secrets are
protected by the statute and Agency regulations. 42
U.S.C. Section 9604(e); 40 C.F.R. Section 2.203(b).




To secure a warrant, the following procedures
should be observed:
Contact Regional Counsel. EPA personnel should
discuss with Regional Counsel the facts regarding
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the denial of consent or other factors justifying a
warrant and the circumstances which give rise to the
need for entry.
Contact Department of Justice. If after consultation
with Regional counsel a decision is made to seek a
warrant, the Regional Counsel must contact directly
the Environmental Enforcement Section in the Land
and Natural Resources Division at the Department
of Justice. 8 The person to call at the Department is
the Assistant Chief in the Environmental
Enforcement Section assigned to the Region. The
Assistant Chief will then arrange, in a timely
manner, for the matter to be handled by either an
Environmental Enforcement Section attorney or a
U.S. Attorney. The Region must send to the
Environment Section, by Magnafax or other
expedited means, a draft warrant application and a
short memorandum concisely stating why the
warrant is needed.
Prepare Warrant Application. The warrant
application must contain the following:
1) a statement of EPA's Authority to inspect;
(see Section II, supra)
2) a clear identification of the name and
location of the site and, if known, the
name(s) of the owner and operator of the
site;
8 This procedure is necessary to comply with internal Department of Justice delegations
of authority. Referral to a local U.S. Attorney's office is not sufficient for CERCLA
warrants. The Environmental Enforcement Section of the Department of Justice must
approve all warrant applications. (See Memorandum from David T. Buente, Jr. to All
Environmental Enforcement Attorneys, "Procedures for Authorizing Applications for
Civil Search Warrants Under CERCLA" (4/3/87) attached).
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3) a statement explaining the grounds for a
finding of a reasonable basis for entry (i.e., a
reasonable basis to believe that there may be
a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant) and the purpose for entry (i.e.,
determining the need for response, or
choosing or taking any response action, or
otherwise enforcing CERCLA);
4) affidavits supporting the asserted reasonable
basis for entry and describing any attempts
to gain access on consent, if applicable; and
5) a specific description of the extent, nature,
and timing of the inspection;
Following preparation of the warrant application, the Justice
Department attorney will file the application with the local U.S.
Magistrate.
EPA may ask the Justice Department attorney to seek the
assistance of the United States Marshals Service in executing the warrant
where EPA perceives a danger to the personnel executing the warrant or
where there is the possibility that evidence will be destroyed.
2. Reasonable Basis for Entry
A warrant for access on a civil matter may be
obtained upon a showing of a reasonable basis for
entry. This reasonable basis may be established
either by presenting specific evidence relating to the
facility to be entered or by demonstrating that the
entry is part of a neutral administrative inspection
plan.
A specific evidence standard is incorporated in
SARA as a condition on EPA's exercise of its
access authority: EPA must have "a reasonable
basis to believe there may be a release or threat of a
release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant." Section 104(e)(1). SARA's express
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specific evidence standard is consistent with how
courts have formulated the specific evidence test in
the absence of statutory guidance. E.g., West Point-
Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 958 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (there must be a "showing of specific
evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
suspicion of a violation").
In drafting a warrant application, conclusory
allegations regarding the specific evidence standard
under subsection 104(e) will not suffice. Courts
generally have refused to approve warrants where
the application contains mere boilerplate assertions
of statutory violations. Warrant applications have
been granted, on the other hand, where the
application contained detailed attestations by
government officials or third-party complaints
which have some indicia of reliability. Ideally,
EPA warrant applications should contain an
affidavit of a person who has personally observed
conditions which indicate that there may be a
release or threat of a release of a hazardous
substance. If they are available, sampling results,
although not required, should also be attached.
Warrant applications based on citizen, employee, or
competitor complaints should include details that
establish the complainant's credibility.9
C. Court Orders
The provisions in CERCLA authorizing EPA access may
be enforced by court order. To obtain a court order for
entry, the Region should follow the normal referral process.
9 If information gathered in a civil investigation suggests that a criminal violation may
have occurred, EPA personnel should consult the guidance on parallel proceedings.(Memorandum from Courtney Price to Assistant Administrators et al., "Policy and
Procedures on Parallel Proceedings at the Environmental Protection Agency" (1/23/84)).Use of CERCLA's information-gathering authority in criminal investigations is
addressed in separate guidance. Memorandum from Courtney M. Price to Assistant
Administrators et al., "The Use of Administrative Discovery Devices in the Development
of Cases Assigned to the Office of Criminal Investigations" (2/16/84)).
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If only access is required, the referral package can
obviously be much abbreviated. If timing is critical, EPA
HQ will move expeditiously and will refer the case orally if
necessary. The Regions, however, should attempt to
anticipate the sites at which access may prove problematic
and should allow sufficient lead time for the referral
process and the operation of the courts. The Regions
should also not enter lengthy negotiations with landowners
over access. EPA and DOJ are prepared to litigate
aggressively to establish EPA's right of access.
Prior to seeking a court order, EPA should request access,
generally in writing, and assemble the record related to
access. The showing necessary to obtain a court order is
the same as for obtaining a warrant: EPA must show a
reasonable basis to believe that there may be a release of a
threat of a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant. An EPA finding on whether there is reason to
believe a release has occurred or is about to occur must be
reviewed on the arbitrary and capricious standard. Section
104(e)(5) (B)(i). If the matter is not already in court, EPA
must file a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief. Simultaneous to filing the complaint, EPA may, if
necessary, file a motion, supported by affidavits
documenting the release or threatened release, requesting
an immediate order in aid of access. If the matter is already
in litigation, EPA may proceed by motion to seek an order
granting access.' 0
10 Parenthetically, it should be noted that the broad equitable power granted to courts in
Section 106 can also be relied on to obtain a court order. An additional source of
authority for courts in this regard is the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1651. The Act
authorizes federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions . . . ." 28 U.S.C. Section 1651. This authority "extends under
appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or
engaged in wrongdoing are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order.
.. " United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977). Thus, the All
Writs Act may prove useful as a means of compelling persons not a party to a consent
decree to cooperate with EPA and other settling parties in execution of the decree. The
use of the All Writs Act, however, may be limited in light of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshal
Service, 88 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1985).
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In a memorandum supporting EPA's request for relief it
should be made clear that by invoking judicial process,
EPA is not inviting judicial review of its decision to
undertake response action or of any administrative
determinations with regard to the response action. Section
113(h) of SARA bars judicial review of removal or
remedial action except in five enumerated circumstances.
A judicial action to compel access is not one of the
exceptions. Statements on the floor of the House and the
Senate confirm that EPA enforcement of its access
authority does not provide an opportunity for judicial
review of response decisions. Senator Thurmond,
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, remarked that when
EPA requests a court to compel access "there is no
jurisdiction at that time to review any response action.
[T]he court may only review whether the Agency's
conclusion that there is a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances is arbitrary or capricious." 132 Cong.
Rec. S14929 (October 3, 1986) (Statement of Sen.
Thurmond); 132 Cong. Rec. 119582 (October 8, 1986)
(Statement of Rep. Glickman); see United States v.
Standard Equipment, Inc., No. C83- 252M (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 3, 1986).
D. Administrative Orders
If a site owner denies an EPA request for access, EPA may
issue an administrative order directing compliance with the
request. Section 104(e)(5)(A). Each administrative order
must include a finding by the Regional Administrator that
there exists a reasonable belief that there may be a release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and a
description of the purpose for the entry and of the activities
to be conducted and their probable duration. The order
should indicate the nature of the prior request for access.
Further, the order should advise the respondent that the
administrative record upon which the order was issued is
available for review and that an EPA officer or employee
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will be available to confer with respondent prior to the
effective date of the order. The length of the time period
during which such a conferences may be requested should
be reasonable under the circumstances. In deciding what is
a reasonable time period, side ration should be given to the
interference access will cause with onsite operations, the
threat to human health and the environment posed by the
site, and the extent of prior contacts with the respondent.
The order should advise the respondent that penalties of up
to $25,000 per day may be assessed by a court against any
party who unreasonably fails to comply with an order,
Section 104(e)(5). Following the time period for the
conference and any conference, the issuing official should
send a document to the respondent summarizing any
conference, EPA's resolution of any objections, and stating
the effective date of the order.
If, following issuance of an administrative order, the site owner
continues to refuse access to EPA, the order may be enforced in federal
court. EPA should not use self-help to execute orders. Courts are
required to enforce administrative orders where there is a reasonable basis
to believe that there may be a release or threat of a release of a hazardous
substance. EPA's determination in this regard must be upheld unless it is
arbitrary and capricious, Section 104(e)(5)(B)(i). EPA will seek penalties
from those parties who unreasonably fail to comply with orders.
All administrative orders for access must be concurred on by the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring prior to issuance.
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DISCLAIMER
The policies and procedures established in this document are
intended solely for the guidance of government personnel. They
are not intended, and cannot be relied upon to create any rights,
substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party in litigation
with the United States. The Agency reserves the right to act at
variance with these policies and procedures and to change them at
any time without public notice.
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EXHIBIT A
CONSENT FOR ACCESS TO PROPERTY
Name:
Address of Property:
I consent to officers, employees, and authorized representatives of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entering and
having continued access to my property for the following purposes:
[the taking of such soil, water, and air samples as may be
determined necessary;]
[the sampling of any solids or liquids stored or disposed of on site;]
[the drilling of holes and installation of monitoring wells for
subsurface investigation;]
[other actions related to the investigation. of surface or subsurface
contamination;]
the taking of a response action including .... ]
I realize that these actions by EPA are undertaken pursuant to its response
and enforcement responsibilities under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. Section
9601 et seq.
This written permission is given by me voluntarily with knowledge
of my right to refuse and without threats or promises of any kind.
Date Signature
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EXHIBIT B
SITE ACCESS AND LICENSE AGREEMENT
This Agreement is made and entered into this _ day of July,
2000, by and between I. M. OWNER (hereinafter "Owner") having as its
address c/o Florida 33870-7204,
BIG HIGH-TECH COMPANY, having an address of
(hereinafter referred to as "BIG
HTC" or "Adjacent Owner"), and WONDERFUL ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES, INC., having an address of
and any other subcontractor of WES, pre-approved in writing by Adjacent
Owner (collectively referred to as "WES" or "Adjacent Owner's
Contractor")
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Owner owns a comprehensive general professional
practice and building operating and located on certain real property in
Sunny, Florida (the "Property"), legally described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and made a part hereof.
WHEREAS, Adjacent Owner is the owner and operator of a
convenience store and petroleum retail facility, referred to by Adjacent
Owner as Deep Hole #222, which facility is located on Sunnyside Drive in
Sunny, Florida, and is adjacent to the Property.
WHEREAS, in October 13, 1999, Adjacent Owner learned that
free petroleum product was observed in sumps above underground storage
tanks at the site of the convenience store and petroleum retail facility. In
response to this, Adjacent Owner submitted a Discharge Reporting Form
to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), and
commenced initial free product recovery activities at that time.
WHEREAS, in response to this free product discovery and to the
submission of the Discharge Reporting Form to DEP, Adjacent Owner
retained WES to perform a contamination assessment in accordance with
the requirements of DEP. The results of that assessment were contained in
a report entitled "Limited Contamination Assessment Report" prepared by
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WES dated March 15, 2000. WES provided a copy of that report at the
request of Adjacent Owner, to DEP.
WHEREAS, DEP reviewed the Report and by letter dated May
13, 2000 (such letter being attached hereto as Exhibit "B") recommended
additional sampling and the construction of additional wells.
WHEREAS, in response to the DEP request, Adjacent Owner
intends to drill one and possibly a second well on the Property of Owner,
such wells being located at the locations indicated on the sketch attached
hereto as Exhibit "C".
WHEREAS, Owner is willing to allow Adjacent Owner and WES
to drill such well or wells conditioned upon Adjacent Owner and Wes's
compliance with the provisions of this Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the recitals set forth
above and good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged, Owner, Adjacent Owner and WES hereby
agree as follows:
1. Owner hereby grants Adjacent Owner's Contractor reasonable access
to the Property for the sole purpose of installing and sampling up to
two monitoring wells (the "Monitoring Wells") (the "Work") in
accordance generally with the two locations described in the sketch
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C"; provided, however, the exact
location for such wells shall be subject to Owner's prior written
approval. With respect to the Work, Adjacent Owner and WES shall
comply with all requirements imposed by DEP, including but not
limited to requirements as to the depth of such wells and the laboratory
parameters for sampling. Adjacent Owner and WES have represented
to Owner that if the northerly of the two wells noted is not shown
through sampling results to be impacted, the southerly well will not be
installed. Owner agrees that such construction, sampling and re-
sampling of the Monitoring Wells by Adjacent Owner's Contractor
pursuant to this Agreement creates no obligation upon Adjacent
Owner subsequently to re-sample any Monitoring Wells on the
Property, except to the extent requested or required by DEP, it being
agreed by the parties that neither the grant of this Site Access
Agreement by Owner nor the performance of the Work by Adjacent
Owner shall be deemed to constitute or give rise to any waiver of any
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defense, right or remedy either party may have against the other,
whether in law or in equity.
2. In connection with conduct of the Work, Owner hereby agrees that
Adjacent Owner's Contractor may bring onto the Property such
equipment or machinery as may be reasonably necessary in order to
complete the Work.
3. The Work shall be performed at Adjacent Owner's sole cost and
expense, and neither WES nor Adjacent Owner shall make any charge
against Owner for the work it performs on or about the Property in
connection with the Work or with this Agreement. Owner's interest
in the Property shall not be subject to liens for improvements made by
Adjacent Owner or by WES, and neither WES nor Adjacent Owner
shall have any power or authority to create any lien or permit any lien
to attach to the Property for any cause or reason. Adjacent Owner's
Contractor, and all materialmen, contractors, artisans, mechanics and
laborers and other persons contracting with Adjacent Owner with
respect to the Property or any part thereof, are hereby charged with
notice that such liens are expressly prohibited and that they must look
solely to Adjacent Owner to secure payment for any work done or
material furnished for improvements by or for any other purpose
during the term of this agreement. Adjacent Owner's Contractor shall
advise all persons furnishing designs, labor, materials or services to the
Property in connection with Adjacent Owner's Contractor's work
thereof of the provisions of this Section. Prior to commencing the
Work on the Property, Adjacent Owner's Contractor (and all
authorized subcontractors) shall provide Adjacent Owner with a
waiver of lien for the Work in the form attached hereto.
4. Adjacent Owner commits to provide funding to WES or to any
replacement Adjacent Owner Contractor, to allow completion of the
Work in accordance with all applicable regulatory requirements.
Adjacent Owner further commits that it shall expend such funds as are
needed to pay for the proper abandonment of the wells (and borings, if
applicable) contemplated to be performed as a part of the Work.
Adjacent Owner represents to Owner that Adjacent Owner concurs in
WES's determination, as Reported in the Limited contamination
Assessment Report on page 5, that "active remediation of the
contaminated groundwater (related to the site studied by the Report)
should be conducted immediately." In that regard, Adjacent Owner
further represents to Owner that it is the intention of Adjacent Owner
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to allow WES to proceed as expeditiously as is possible with the
cleanup and remediation of any petroleum contamination disclosed
and reported in the Limited Contamination Assessment Report.
Adjacent Owner and Adjacent Owner's Contractor jointly agree to
provide Owner (or Owner's counsel if so requested by Owner) with
copies of all data results and reports which arise or are prepared in
connection with the performance of the sampling and of any
remediation related to the Work by Adjacent Owner's Contractor.
5. Adjacent Owner's Contractor shall conduct the activities described
above at the Property at a specific times to be approved in advance in
writing by Owner or by Owner's designated agent, and without
interfering with Owner's conduct of its normal dental operations on
the Property. Adjacent Owner's Contractor shall provide Owner with
at least five (5) days written notice of the date the Work shall begin.
Owner shall have the right to observe the Work and, if desired by
Owner, to take split samples of the samples collected by Adjacent
Owner's Contractor. WES personnel authorized to have access to the
Property under this Agreement shall include DEP employees and
authorized representatives of DEP for purposes of monitoring WES's
activities hereunder.
6. At its sole cost and expense, Adjacent Owner's Contractor shall
maintain its equipment and other materials in an orderly manner while
they are located on the Property and shall promptly remove or engage
a qualified subcontractor (in accordance with all applicable
environmental requirements of all federal, state or local regulatory
authorities having jurisdiction over the Property and the Work)
promptly to remove and properly to dispose of all contaminated
materials excavated or extracted from the Property during the Work.
All debris, trash, equipment and other materials used or caused by the
Work shall similarly be removed prior to the time the Work is
completed. Adjacent Owner's Contractor agrees to complete the work
on the Property as quickly as possible, and to minimize any disruption
of Owner's business and professional activities on the Property. If
Adjacent Owner's Contractor causes damage to the Property during
the Work, the Adjacent Owner's Contractor promptly shall cause such
damage to be repaired, upon written notice to from Owner to Adjacent
Owner or to WES. Upon completion of the Work, WES shall leave
the Property in the same condition as before the Work began, to the
extent possible, except that monitoring well or wells will be required
and allowed to remain in place pursuant to the terms of this
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Agreement, until such time as WES abandons such well(s) in
accordance with applicable regulatory provisions.
7. WES and Adjacent Owner jointly agree to indemnify and to defend,
protect, and hold harmless Owner, and Owner's agents from any and
all losses, liabilities, fines, damages, injuries, penalties, response costs,
or claims of any and every kind, whatsoever paid, incurred or asserted
against or threatened to be asserted against Owner or Owner's agents,
resulting from or in any way connected with the access granted to
Adjacent Owner and to WES pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement, or connected with or related to the performance of the
Work pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. Adjacent Owner
further agrees to reimburse Owner for all reasonable environmental
consultant and attorneys fees which environmental consultants and
counsel to Owner (which, in the instance of "counsel" is intended to be
a term that shall include both Owner's regular counsel and any special
environmental counsel retained by Owner in connection with this
matter) charge to Owner for professional services related to the Work,
to this Agreement, and to the site assessment and remediation related
thereto. Owner shall submit copies of such invoices to Adjacent
Owner through a submission to Adjacent Owner's Contractor,
including an indication of whether those statements have as of that
time been paid by Owner, and Adjacent Owner's Contractor agrees
promptly to submit such requests for reimbursement to Adjacent
Owner. Adjacent Owner agrees to review, process and pay such
requests, within a reasonable time period after they are received by it
from its Contractor.
8. During the term hereof and at all times during which access is
available to Adjacent Owner's Contractor, WES and all subcontractors
performing the activities described in this Agreement, and their
employees and agents shall maintain insurance with the following
coverage:
(1) Workmen's Compensation with statutory limits;
(2) Automobile Liability with $1,000,000.00 single
limit or equivalent; and
(3) Comprehensive General Liability, including
contractor liability covering Adjacent Owner's
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obligations set forth in paragraph 6, with
$1,000,000.00 single limit or equivalent.
Prior to commencing the Work, Adjacent Owner's Contractor and all
subcontractors shall provide Owner with a Certificate of Insurance,
naming Owner as an additional insured, showing coverage no less than
set forth above.
9. The right of access to the Property pursuant to this Site Access and
License Agreement shall terminate June 30, 2003, or upon DEP
issuance of a Site Rehabilitation Completion Order, whichever earlier
occurs. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Owner may terminate such
right of access under this Agreement, upon .Owner's submission of
written notice to Adjacent Owner and to WES advising those parties of
a breach of this Agreement by WES, Adjacent Owner or by their
employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors. Termination of the
right of access pursuant to this Agreement shall not operate as a, not
shall it be construed to, release of any party to this Agreement from
contractual, reimbursement or indemnification obligations arising from
the provisions of this Agreement, or by operation of law. The term of
this Agreement may be extended if such extension is in writing, and is
executed by all parties hereto.
10. This Agreement shall be binding upon the Owner, Adjacent Owner,
the Adjacent Owner's Contractor and their respective successors and
assigns, but this provision shall not be interpreted to permit Adjacent
Owner or WES to assign their responsibilities hereunder without the
prior written consent of Owner.
11. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, all of
which together shall constitute one and the same instrument, any party
or signatory hereto may execute this Agreement by signing any such
counterpart. Delivery of a facsimile of an executed copy of this
Agreement shall be effective to bind the executing party. Each party
so executing this Agreement shall promptly deliver an original
executed counterpart to the other signatories.
12. Adjacent Owner agrees to provide to Owner a copy of all data derived
from Adjacent Owner's work on the Property or adjacent properties
within a reasonable time, but in no event later than four (4) weeks after
the completion of such sampling event or events. In the event that
Owner splits samples with Adjacent Owner's Contractor, Owner
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agrees to provide Adjacent Owner a copy of all data derived from
Owner's split samples within a reasonable time, but in no event later
than four (4) weeks after the completion of such sampling event or
events.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Owner, Adjacent Owner, and
Adjacent Owner's Contractor have caused this Agreement to be executed
on the date and year indicated below.
Executed by Adjacent Owner on April 1, 2002.
Executed by Adjacent Owner on April 1, 2002.







Fame Yus Geologist, PG, President
"ADJACENT OWNER'S CONTRACTOR"
BIG HIGH-TECH COMPANY
By:
Title:
ADJACENT OWNER
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